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Abstract 
Stress testing is a general term for framework that can assess possible impact of an 
adverse shock on the financial health and a capital adequacy of a bank, other financial 
institution or whole financial system. Because credit risk is typically the most important 
risk for a bank and many international surveys describe the credit risk stress testing as one 
of the least developed, it is be the main topic of this thesis.  
The credit risk stress testing methods developed in the last years very dynamically 
especially thanks to the requirements on stress testing under the new Basel II regulatory 
framework, but further improvement of these methods is perceived to be able to withstand 
severe crisis.  
The thesis concentrates on the micro level stress tests that are run by each 
individual bank. It describes the whole credit risk stress testing procedure, Basel II 
regulatory requirements, the importance for an institution and offers examples of stress 
tests.  
The first significant contribution to the topic is a survey of the practice in the mayor 
Czech banks that analyze whether they are influenced in their credit risk stress testing 
framework by their parents or the supervisory institution, whether the stress techniques and 
scenarios vary across the Czech banks considerably and whether the scenarios changed in 
some way before or during the current crisis. 
The other contributive part contains a model of stress test on a real corporate credit 
portfolio of one Czech bank, which uses data on PD for different level of segmentation of 
this portfolio. The scenarios used are the most actual forecasts of the Czech National Bank. 
Based on results from this model it is shown how the correctly applied bottom-up approach 
to stress testing is important for a precise estimation of the minimum capital requirement 
under stress.  
 
 
Abstrakt 
 
Zátěžové testování je obecným termínem pro metody, které zkoumají dopad 
negativního šoku na finanční podmínky a kapitálovou přiměřenost finančních institucí. 
Jelikož úvěrové riziko je typicky nejvýznamnější bankovní riziko a jak naznačují 
mezinárodní studie, metody pro jeho zátěžové testování jsou nejméně rozvinuté, je 
hlavním předmětem práce. Tématem je především zátěžové testování na mikro úrovni, 
tedy testy prováděné jednotlivými bankami. V teoretické části je podrobně popsán celý 
proces zátěžového testování, požadavky nové regulace Basel II, význam tohoto testování 
pro instituci samotnou a příklady nejčastějších testů. 
Výrazný přínos k tématu spočívá ve studii na téma zátěžového testování provedené 
v největších českých bankách a ve zkonstruovaném modelu, který potvrzuje důležitost 
bottom-up přístupu k testování pro přesnější odhad kapitálového požadavku díky 
segmentaci. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial services offered by banks and other financial institutions are never 
free from risks. A loss due to these risks can materialize during adverse conditions and hit 
the financial stability of an institution. As the world becomes more globalized and financial 
systems are interconnected, problems of financial institutions in one country can easily 
spread and lead to a severe crisis of one or more regions. For this reason tests for 
robustness of institutions and financial sectors to adverse shocks became very important 
tool to ensure financial stability. 
Stress testing is a general term for framework that can assess possible impact of an 
adverse shock on the financial health and a capital adequacy of a bank, other financial 
institution or whole financial system. Because credit risk is typically the most important 
risk for a bank and many international surveys describe the credit risk stress testing as one 
of the least developed, it will be the main topic of this thesis.  
The credit risk stress testing methods developed in the last years very dynamically 
especially thanks to the requirements on stress testing under the new Basel II regulatory 
framework and perceived need to further improve these methods to be able to withstand 
financial crisis such as the current one. 
In general stress tests are run on two levels. The stress tests on whole banking 
system, which are usually carried out by a supervisory body or central bank, are important 
for financial stability of the system considering all interconnections among institutions. 
The micro stress tests run by banks are used for an assessment if the minimum capital 
requirement and an additional capital buffer hold by the bank are sufficiently high to 
withstand adverse but plausible changes in economic conditions that are significant for 
their portfolio value. The latter type will be the main for this thesis. 
In the following chapter I will explain what the stress testing is and what the 
sources of credit risk are. I will sum main Basel II requirements on stress testing and credit 
risk measurement and explain why credit risk is one of the most problematic risk for 
measurement and stress testing. The third chapter will introduce the most common credit 
risk models, their main logic and assumptions, because the credit risk model used by the 
institution usually determines the stress testing methods applied. The fourth chapter will 
cover the stress testing process in the institution and possibilities how a stress test scenario 
can be defined. In the fifth chapter I will connect the credit risk models and definition of 
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scenarios by description of stress testing techniques and concrete stress tests that an 
institution can apply to its credit portfolio.  
In the chapter six I describe my own survey on stress testing practice at the mayor 
Czech banks and try to answer three research questions. Based on interviews with experts 
from banks` credit risk stress testing departments I will analyze whether the Czech banks 
are influenced in their credit risk stress testing framework by their parents or the 
supervisory institution, whether the stress techniques and scenarios vary across the Czech 
banks considerably and whether the scenarios changed in some way before or during the 
current crisis. 
In the seventh chapter I will apply a stress test on a real corporate credit portfolio of 
one Czech bank, which is quite rare in the literature. The data on PD for different level of 
segmentation of corporate loan portfolio will be stressed based on the scenarios for 
economic variables that turned to be significant in a regression model. Finally it will be 
shown how important is the segmentation of the data on a probability of default for a 
correct estimation of minimum capital requirement. The last chapter concludes.          
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2. Definition of credit risk stress testing 
2.1 Basel II structure 
 The actual stress testing requirements for financial institutions within the European 
Union are encompassed in the Basel II (also called New Basel Capital Accord) and its 
main document BCBS (2006). This new international recommendation for regulation, 
which partly changes the earlier principles and initial EU regulation summed in the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards from 1988, 
became in force on 1.1. 20071.   
Although Basel I already defined capital adequacy concept, the credit risk was the 
only one considered. In 1996 an Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market 
Risks was approved and market risk became part of capital adequacy measure.  
The Basel II regulation introduces the three pillar structure, in which, according to 
Andersson, Lindell (2008), under the first pillar the institution is asked to compute 
minimum capital requirements2 for the three main financial risks; credit, market and 
operational risk. For each of these risk types, banks can choose one out of several methods 
with different level of sophistication, where more advanced methods requiring more 
investment from the bank’s side tends to lead to lower capital requirements. 
 Under the second pillar according to BCBS (2006) further internal models are 
required to estimate additional capital buffer that the institution needs to hold, taking into 
account specific risk profile of its portfolio, that could not be considered in a general 
formulas applied under the first pillar for minimum capital requirement estimation and 
further capital needs can be estimated according to other risks run by the institution3. The 
bank must demonstrate to the supervisory institution that all risks not covered under the 
first pillar are satisfactorily monitored and managed. The last pillar, as in Andersson, 
Lindell (2008), specifies the disclosure requirements on information of the bank’s risk 
profile, risk management and capital strategies. For Basel II structure see Figure 2.1 below. 
                                                 
1
 In the Czech Republic this regulation is the subject of the CNB decree 123/2007coll. amended by decree 
282/2008, which came into force on May 15 2007 and August 15 2008 respectively. It takes effect since 
1.7.2007, accepting a possibility that banks can apply this regulation since the beginning of 2008.   
2
 The Basel I concepts from 1988 and 1996 had only one pillar specifying the minimum capital requirements 
for risks mentioned. With Basel II approach to credit risk measurement was changed to be more sensitive to 
risk. Clients can be differentiated according to credit quality to categories with assigned risk weights.    
3
 The stress testing is applied under both, the first and the second pillar. 
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Figure 2.1: Basel II structure 
 
Source: based on BCBS (2006) adjusted by author 
2.2 Stress testing definition and current stage of development 
According to CEBS (2006, pp. 3) stress testing in general, considering any type of 
risk, is defined as a term for describing the various techniques (quantitative or qualitative) 
used by institutions to gauge their vulnerability to exceptional but plausible events, while 
the level and complexity of stress testing used can vary according to the size and level of 
sophistication of this institution.  
Similar definitions can be found in papers by national supervisory bodies as in the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), where stress testing is defined as an in-depth analysis of a 
potential impact of a critical event on the institution.  
Generally speaking the term stress testing denotes techniques that try to estimate 
the effect of quite rare but still plausible events, either endogenous or exogenous, on the 
institution’s portfolio, financial prosperity and capital needed to withstand such a negative 
development. The key problem in stress testing is to detect the most important risk factors 
or risk drivers that can significantly influence the portfolio value and based on them 
identify scenarios, which would have the above mentioned characteristics.  
Once the scenario is prepared and the relevant changes in risk factors are defined, 
they can be incorporated into statistical models so that a future portfolio loss for the 
institution can be estimated. Further the loss conditioned on the event occurrence can be 
presented to the management, which decides if such losses are still tolerable or if to take 
any counter measures. In this way, stress testing helps to identify, what kind of future 
market development can be critical or significantly adverse for a financial institution. 
The decision about the stress testing methods and scenarios used depends on the 
institution itself, but must be finally approved by the supervisory body. The severity of 
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scenarios considered usually depends on the risk tolerance of management, while methods 
of stress testing hinge on the model used for risk measurement4. 
The main purpose of stress testing and reason why these techniques became part of 
the European regulation is the improvement of stability of financial institutions and whole 
financial system. As the financial system is often hit by adverse changes in the financial 
and other economic variables and financial systems become more global, the financial 
crises can spread easier and the contagion effect and danger of severe losses increases; the 
improvement in international regulation to keep financial institutions more sTable was 
necessary. 
High-quality stress testing program on the level of individual institutions can help 
to see sensitivity of their portfolios to possible adverse economic development and make 
corrective measures in advance or prepare enough capital buffer. Additionally the stress 
tests conducted by the supervisory body or central bank on the aggregated financial data 
can analyze weaknesses and threats for the whole financial system5 such as contagion 
effect, which can not be seen on individual level.  
During the last years stress testing developed considerably and started to be an 
integral part of the institutions` risk management accompanied by a commonly used VaR-
type analysis. Even though, based on the survey of BIS_CGFS (2005) the usage and 
sophistication of stress testing on the level of an individual financial institution seems to 
vary across the portfolios and types of risks considerably.  
In the portfolios consisting of market traded securities, stress testing methods tend 
to be more developed, because of higher availability of data thanks to their regular 
marking-to-market. Similarly for some types of risks the level of stress testing practice is 
                                                 
4
 In the case of credit risk, under the first pillar the stress testing heavily depend on the rating method used. 
For the IRB institutions the risk parameters are often stressed according to expected future macroeconomic 
development and estimated sensitivities of risk parameters to the economic variables or according to their 
historical volatilities as explained in chapter 4 and 5. Further they can be used in Basel II formulas for 
minimum capital requirement. Under the second pillar the assumptions of economic capital models are often 
changed to incorporate risk into the particular model used by the institution.  
5
 Such stress tests for whole banking sector were significantly improved within the project of Financial 
Stability Assessment Program introduced in May 1999 by the IMF and WB, which main aim is to identify 
the main vulnerabilities and strengths of countries` financial sectors and develop risk management. 
Nowadays similar stress testing programs are run by many EU supervisory bodies and central banks. The 
CNB’s role in stress testing in the Czech Republic will be described in details in chapter 7 and compared to 
similar programs in Germany and Austria. 
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far more described and surveyed then for others. The stress testing for the market risk is 
considered to be one of the most developed, followed by liquidity and operational risk, 
while credit risk stress testing in loan book lags, because of the lack in the market data on 
the products. The least developed stress testing methods are those that could monitor losses 
due to more risks, such as integration of market and credit risk stress testing6.   
2.3 Sources of credit risk  
The credit risk is the most important risk for a bank7 and as such the risk 
management for credit risk should be the core stone. Credit risk is actually the risk that an 
obligor will default on his obligations and will not be able or willing to repay the cash 
flows as agreed8; that can have an adverse impact on the bank’s solvency and liquidity.  
According to the CNB decree (123/2007 and 282/2008 Coll.) the obligor is in 
default, if it can be expected that he will not meet his payments when they become due and 
the bank will not be able to cover his obligations from the collateral or when the repayment 
of face amount or any connected significant payment is post the due date for more than 90 
days.  
In Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) we can find a more general definition of credit 
risk. In a broader sense, credit risk denotes as well the risk of a deterioration in a 
borrower’s creditworthiness (migration risk), which leads to a revaluation of the relevant 
assets. The debtor’s downgrading, either by the external rating agency or within the 
internal rating system of a bank, due to worsening of its characteristics that are important 
for his credit quality leads, even if the loan is not traded or priced on the market, to higher 
capital requirements and higher probability of materialization of loss in case of default 
event.9  
                                                 
6
 Considering this problem we can already find steps to integrate market and credit risk stress testing like in 
Kafetzaki-Boulamatsis, Tasche (2001), who tries to estimate within the Merton type model explained in 
chapter 4 capital for credit, interest rate and foreign exchange risk. 
7
 Considering the Czech banking sector the supportive arguments can be found in Financial market 
supervision report (2008) (pp. 81), while the same holds also for EU countries according to BIS_CGFS 
(2005).  
8
 This definition of credit risk is sometimes called narrower, because default risk can be considered as just 
one of sources of credit risk. 
9
 The difference between broader and the narrower definition of credit risk is most evident in the default 
mode and mark-to-market credit risk models covered in the chapter 3. The first see as credit risk only a risk 
that an obligor defaults, while in the latter a migration risk is considered as well.  
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2.4 Availability of data and probability distribution 
As mentioned, according to the national study of Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) as 
well as according to the international study by BIS_CGFS (2005) the credit risk 
measurement and especially stress testing, in comparison with the market risk significantly 
lags. This feature steams from low availability of market data on credit products, as for 
example loans. These products are not regularly marked-to-market, so data on their 
everyday market prices are missing. Furthermore the default events are not so common as 
for market portfolios, so statistics on defaults is poorer in spite of the fact that credit 
products have usually longer maturity.  
Moreover the distribution of losses for credit products is much more complicated 
for estimation. Because of the typical characteristics of these products the distribution is 
non-normal and significantly skewed, as depicted on the Figure 2.2. The asymmetric 
thicker left tail streams from quite low probable high losses in the case when an obligor 
defaults and the whole value of the loan is lost, while the right part depicts more probable, 
but significantly lower than proportional profit that can be earned on interest. 
   
Figure 2.2: Comparison of market and credit returns 
  
Source: CreditMetrics Technical Document 
2.5 Credit risk modeling and credit risk stress testing within Basel II  
As defined in BSBC (2006), under the first pillar of Basel II the minimum capital 
requirement for credit risk should be computed. For doing this the bank can decide for one 
of three methods; Standardised, IRB foundation and IRB advanced method, where for the 
latter two it needs to ask the regulator for a permission to use such method. The methods 
differ in the quantitative as well as qualitative requirements on the credit rating system10. 
                                                 
10
 For example, if an institution wants to apply for using IRB for some clients, it has to use rating system for 
this category of clients already at least for three years and have data on probability of defaults from at least 
five last years (or two years in special cases). There are special requirements for data storage, equal treatment 
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Under the standardised rating approach the bank can use ratings from Export Credit 
Agencies11 to see the credit quality of the client and assign him the risk weights defined in 
Basel II, which are needed for further minimum capital requirement computation.  
On the other hand under both of the IRB approaches, the clients` ratings are set by 
an internal rating process, which also assign to each client values of Basel II risk 
parameters12, which are further used for risk weighted exposure computation. IRB 
approaches enable banks to compute regulatory capital more precisely, according to their 
historical experience on how probable and how big losses were connected with clients 
from each rating class and with what kind of product. The Standardised method is far less 
sensitive, because the values of the parameters are determined and can not be adjusted 
according to the experience of the bank. 
Under the first pillar the bank computes so called expected and unexpected loss that 
must be covered by the bank’s capital. The former should be covered through income 
received by properly pricing the transactions; for the latter the capital adequacy and 
reserves are prepared. The expected loss is defined as a mean of the loss expected, in the 
case of credit risk, in one year horizon. The unexpected loss is the difference between 
expected loss and maximum loss that can appear within the year with 99,9% probability. 
The actual capital of the bank should never decrease under the sum of these two measures. 
Under the second pillar, in the context of credit risk, so called economic capital is 
computed. Economic capital is generally defined as capital needed to cover the unexpected 
loss over given time horizon with given probability. The economic capital usually differs 
from the regulatory one, because it should take into account more specific characteristics 
of the portfolio as diversification, concentration or difference between experienced credit 
risk parameters to those prescribed under the first pillar. For this reason we can see 
economic capital as a measure of capital that bank itself see as needed for losses from its 
risky activities to withstand them with some required probability level, which usually 
corresponds to the rating that the institution wants to reach or stay at. If the regulation is set 
                                                                                                                                                    
of clients for rating classification, number of rating classes, which must be at the same time enough granular, 
for documentation of rating process, stress testing, backtesting etc. more details can be found in BCBS 
(2006) and CNB decree 123/2007 and 282/2008. 
11
 Including external rating agencies such as S&P, Moody`s etc. 
12
 Under the IRB foundation approach at least the probability of default is set for all clients and for retail 
clients all parameters as probability of default, loss given default, maturity, exposure, and conversion factor, 
are set within the internal rating system. 
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correctly, the regulatory and economic capital should be the same or at least very close to 
each other, because they both should estimate the same; the capital needed to cover the 
risks run by the institution.  
According to Bangia et al. (2002), if the economic capital is higher than the 
regulatory one, the Basel II concept undervalues the risks run by the institution; additional 
capital buffer must be hold by the institution to cover its losses that materialize with certain 
probability. If the economic capital is lower than the regulatory, the institution anyway 
needs to hold enough capital to meet regulatory requirements even though the regulatory 
rules overestimate the actual risk. The capital for undertaken risks, as perceived by the 
institution, is lower which may motivate the institution to increase its risk profile.   
According to BCBS (2006) as in Rösch, Scheule (2008) a bank must have in place 
sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of capital adequacy. These stress 
measures must be compared against the measure of expected positive exposure and 
considered by the bank as part of its internal capital adequacy assessment process. Stress 
testing must also involve identifying possible events or future changes in the economic 
conditions that could have unfavorable effects on a firm’s credit exposure and assessment 
of the ability to withstand such changes. Examples of scenarios that could be used are 
economic or industry downturns, market-place events or decreased liquidity conditions. 
The stress testing is required to be part of the risk management framework and 
should be conducted under both the first and the second pillar. It should search for loss and 
changes in the capital, either minimum required capital or economic capital, in case of 
adverse future development. Under the first pillar the changes in minimum required capital 
thanks to changes in risk parameters for different segments of the institution’s portfolio are 
estimated; under the second pillar all differences from the assumptions made for the model 
under the first pillar and changes in the economic capital for future extreme events should 
be covered.  
The requirements for stress testing according to the CNB decree (No. 123/2007 
Coll. as amended by Decree No. 282/2008 Coll.) are very similar to the Basel II ones. The 
financial institutions should identify all possible events or future economic changes, which 
could adversely influence the value of the credit position and assess the ability to withstand 
such changes. Stress testing should be reasonable and conservative, should consider at least 
mild recession and according to the 2006/48/EC also migration in rating and deterioration 
in credit quality of protection providers. Furthermore stress tests should cover most of the 
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risky positions. The scenarios and stress testing methods are defined by the institutions and 
approved by the CNB. 
The stress tests for credit risk should be according to the requirements based on 
CEBS (2006), run as frequently as necessary according to the risk drivers and volatility in 
stress testing framework, but at least once a year. With this frequency it should be 
evaluated if the methodology and scenarios are still adequate for current conditions and 
portfolio structure and should be up-dated if necessary. It is also recommended for stress 
tests for credit risk to take into account longer time periods than for example for market 
risk, because of the longer maturity and lower possibility to change the portfolio 
structure13. 
 The complexity of stress testing program is allowed to differ according to the size 
and complexity of the institution, while key control over the whole institution’s stress 
testing program is assigned to the supervisory body that must review its appropriateness. 
The supervisory authority can also prescribe an ad hoc test at a specific point in time e.g. 
when there is a significant change in environment or financial markets or wants to asses an 
impact of the same stress scenario on the wide range of institutions14.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Further requirements and recommendation of Basel II connected with credit risk stress testing and 
modeling can be found in BCBS (2006). 
14
 This rule is used regularly since 2009 for the bottom-up stress tests run by the CNB as explained in the 
chapter 7. 
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3. Credit risk management models 
Credit risk management in a financial institution can be seen as two-stage problem. 
First, the decision about the composition of the portfolio is done according to the standard 
methods, which are commonly used in credit risk portfolio management like Value at Risk 
or its alternative for credit risk, based on the same logic or other well known models 
explained further. As in Singapore (2002) the second problem in the credit risk portfolio 
management is analysis of the reaction of portfolio value during unsTable times, when 
factors that were considered during the VaR analysis to behave in the similar way as in the 
past observation start to be unsTable. 
3.1 Value at risk 
The VaR types of models are based on the basic logic of estimation of loss that will 
materialize within a given confidence interval over some period of time under normal 
conditions. At the level of an individual instrument, the assessment of the counterparty or 
instrument risk as its volatility plays the key role as well as the assumption on the 
distribution of rates of return on the instrument. The maximum loss over one year under 
the standard normal distribution that will not be exceeded in 99 % of cases can be 
computed as follows. 
0199,01 ** WVaR YY =− = σα  
 
Figure 3.1: VaR model 
Loss Profit 
 
Source: author  
 
On the portfolio level, the VaR can be computed based on the correlations between 
each two instruments or counterparties. 
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The similar logic is used by some other models like economic capital models 
described further, which compute the expected price of the loan and its volatility due to 
credit risk and apply the similar logic to estimate Capital at Risk (CaR)15. 
The biggest disadvantage of VaR-types of models is that they often use an 
assumption on the distribution of the future value, which is usually supposed to be at least 
symmetric with thin tails like on the Figure 3.1. This according to empirical findings 
described above does not hold for credit products. The assumptions can be eased by using 
historical observations that can much better approximate the truth probability distribution 
of the future value of a portfolio and according to this observed distribution the more 
precise VaR value can be set as in Soberhart (2008).  
Even though the second disadvantage of this model stays unsolved. The VaR 
analyses expect that the past behavior of the instruments` values can characterize their 
development during the horizon of the analysis. This can be true for calm periods, when 
market factors do not change considerably and the forecast based on past behavior can be 
accepTable at least for a short horizon. On the other hand in more turbulent periods or even 
in crisis, when economic factors become unsTable, even such short run forecasts of future 
value of the portfolio will be wrong. 
 
3.2 Difference of stress testing and VaR, importance of stress testing for an 
institution 
According to Schachter (2001) there are few imperfections in modeling abnormal, 
more extreme events by the VaR-types of models, which can be addressed by usage of the 
stress testing programs. Firstly, the VaR models see extreme events as tail observations 
from the same distribution as every other normal day observation, but as argued, the crisis 
observations should be more likely from a different return distribution with different 
characteristics than those considered by VaR for normal market situation. Secondly, if they 
were from the same distribution, VaR analysis would not be able to estimate the exposure 
to such extreme market moves as it is a function expressing the risk as function of changes 
                                                 
15
 Like in CreditMetrics, where expected price of a bond is computed based on the future cash flows 
discounted by relevant discount factors and volatility of the price can be estimated as its standard error. For 
the portfolio CaR we again need to estimate correlations among individual instruments. CreditMetrics is 
described in details in 3.3.2. 
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in normal market rates and prices and finally this analysis does not give any information on 
losses once the VaR measure is exceeded.    
All these shortages of the VaR can be solved by broadening the credit risk 
management program with stress testing. Stress tests are built to estimate exposures and 
losses under extreme situations and even in BCBS (2006) and BIS_CGFS(2005) are said to 
complement VaR. The latter further highlights the importance of stress testing in 
comparison with VaR for understanding firm`s risk profile, verification of adequacy of 
limits and capital allocation or evaluation of business risks.  
As mentioned in FSA (2005) the stress tests can help to identify big sensitivities of 
parts of portfolio or whole business lines to some risk factors and set limits or monitor new 
products for example on new emerging markets, which are more volatile and where few 
data are available. It further helps the management to determine it optimal risk/return 
tradeoff and see, whether they would be satisfied with the value of this ratio under stress 
conditions or some adjustments in portfolio structure or institution’s policy must be done. 
On the other hand also stress testing has its disadvantages, for which it is often 
criticized. As for example in Berkowitz (1999), who sees two results for losses as 
confusing and recommends to incorporate stress events into the VaR analysis as described 
in details in the following part. Further the stress testing program is highly subjective as it 
is very difficult to judge if all relevant risks are included and assessed, when scenarios are 
prepared. Moreover the results from stress test expressed as loss under some extreme 
scenario do not have any probability of occurrence, which can question the importance of 
taking any corrective measures16. To solve shortcomings of both methodologies, there 
already exist some attempts to incorporate stress testing into the standard VaR analysis as 
described in the following part.    
3.2.1 Methods for unification of VaR and stress testing  
According to Schachter (2001) there are two main theoretical approaches, how 
historical observations during normal periods and stress scenarios can be unified. The first 
applied by Cherubini, Della Lunga (1999) uses Bayesian statistics for combining actual 
observed historical data with certain mean, variance and correlation with subjective stress 
scenario. After adding a noise factor to given scenario, conditional as well as unconditional 
                                                 
16
 Remedial measures as listed in the CEBS (2006) are discussed in chapter 6. 
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distribution for historic and expected data can be derived. This distribution already 
encompasses the analysis based on VaR and stress scenario logic.  
  Second theoretical way, how these two concepts can be connected can be found in 
Berkowitz (1999), who directly combine “typical” historical distribution of factors` values 
with subjective stress distribution using as a weight some subjective probability to get a 
combined distribution describing joint behavior of factors under all circumstances. Further 
for forecasting the portfolio return distribution a valuation function describing the portfolio 
value under certain factor setting can be used. Except of these very theoretical approaches, 
there is one more applicable concept; the extreme value theory that tries to adjust tails of 
the classical portfolio value distribution and related block maxima and peak over threshold 
approaches. 
 
3.2.1.1 Extreme Value Theory (EVT), Block Maxima and Peak over Threshold approach 
 The EVT deals with modeling the extreme situations exceeding those considered by 
VaR as depicted on the Figure 3.2. It looks for a statistical distribution of extreme values of 
return respecting the correlations between risk factors; either historical or correlations 
conditional on extreme events can be used to depict the distinct parts of distribution of 
returns17. The EVT has an asymptotic univariate and a multivariate version, the first one is 
used for a tail distribution modeling for portfolios with few assets and sTable positions, 
while the latter better analyzes complex positions with many assets and risks. Basically, 
according to Longin (2000), we can describe the univariate approach of EVT as: 
 
Let’s observe returns over n periods of time and denote the extremes (here minimum, but 
can be derived in the same way for maximum) as: 
{ }nn RRZ ,,min 1 K=  
Where nRR ,,1 K  are independent, taken from the same distribution RF  
 
Then the distribution of minimum value is: 
( ) ( )( )nRZ zFzF n −−= 11 ……..in reality RF is not known 
We can use a scale parameter nα  and a location parameter nβ  to get a limiting distribution 
of minimal returns (for n→∞, T→∞) 
 
Z = ( ) nnnZ αβ /−  
                                                 
17
 The detailed analysis of normal and stress time correlation among risk factors can be found in the section 
4.3.2.1. 
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( ) ( ) 




 +−−= ττ
1
*1exp1 zzFZ ………distribution of tails for z< τ/1−  and τ <0 or z> τ/1−  
and τ >018. 
 
Figure 3.2: Univariate EVT approach  
 
 
Source: by autor 
  As depicted on the Figure 3.2 the main problems of EVT is to find distribution 
relevant for the tails and edge, from where the tails of normal distribution considered for 
the classical VaR method should be replaced (on the Figure defined as x multiple of 
standard deviation). The trade off in this problem is following, the tails must start far 
enough from the mean to describe extreme event only, and on the other hand enough tail 
observations are necessary for estimation of parameters of the tail distribution.   
The multivariate approach differs in the dimension of the vector of extremes, but 
can be derived similarly.19 
                                                 
18
 τ is a tail index, which describes fatness of tails as well as what kind of distribution the tails have. (τ <0 
means Fréchet distribution, τ =0 Gumbel and τ >0 Weibull distribution). Further a shape parameter defined 
as k= τ/1−  describes the moments of the distribution of returns (if k>1 the mean of distribution exists, if 
k>2 variance is finite and if k>3 skewness is well defined) 
19
 Let’s have q-dimensional vector of random variables, i.i.d., where realization of i-th component in time t 
is
1
tR : 
( )qRRRR ,,, 21 K=
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }qnqnnn RRRRRRZ KKKK ,min,min;,min 1221111=
…..vector of minimal returns 
( ) nnnZ αβ /−
 
A q-dimentsional distribution ZF is limiting to extreme value distribution if and only if: 
1) univariate margins
n
ZZZ FFF K
21
,
 have Gumbel, Weibull or Fréchet distribution 
2) there is dependence function ZFd which satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )121 ,,221121 1,, −−−−−= qqqqZF zzzzzzdqqZZZqZ zFzFzFzzzF KLK  
-x*σ x*σ 
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 Two other concepts described in Schachter (2001) are related to the univariate 
EVT; the Block maxima and Peak over threshold approach, both based on statistical limit 
laws for extreme observations20. The Block maxima approach searches for loss that is 
expected to be exceeded once in given number of years k. 
Let’s observe returns over n periods of time and define maximum as: 
{ }nn RRM ,,max 1 K=  
Where nRR ,,1 K  are independent, taken from the same distribution RF  
Then the distribution of maximum value using a scale parameter nα  and a location 
parameter nβ  to get a limiting distribution of minimal returns (for n→∞) can be described 
by: 
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Then the loss x expected to be exceeded once in k years (with probability 1/k), 
where n=1year (we have annual observations) can be expressed as: 
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While Peak over threshold describes, how high loss can be expected once the VaR 
is exceeded or otherwise it expresses the sum of a VaR measure and mean loss from 
generalized distribution. 
K)(
PVaRXPPP
VaRXEVaREL >++= where )( PVaRXPVaRXE >+  is mean of the excess loss 
distribution  for u = PVaR . 
ξ
ξσ
ξ −
−
+
−
=
11
uVaREL PP  
The Peak over threshold approach of EVT can be seen as a special case of Expected 
Shortfall theory, which also measure the average loss above a given quantile of loss 
distribution (α) considered by VaR, but do not use generalized distribution for extreme 
values. According to Kalkbrener et al. (2004) the expected shortfall can be expressed as: 
{ })1*()1())(( )(1 LVaRLLELVaRLLE ααα >−−=>  
                                                 
20
 For precise description of limits laws used see Schachter (2001). 
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3.3 Economic capital credit risk models 
Further I will explain main ideas of the most famous credit risk models that are 
commonly used for economic capital estimation. The economic capital stress testing 
heavily depends on the credit risk model used by the bank, because for stress testing some 
of the settings of the model can be changed according to the scenario, make dependent of 
some economic factors or the assumptions can eased in some other way. Some of the 
possibilities, how credit risk model can be adjusted for stress testing, will be covered in the 
chapter 5.    
Models that are used for estimation of the volume of economic capital needed can 
be divided into default models and mark to market models. Default models consider just 
two stages of the world; either the obligor defaults and the bank looses part of the loan or 
does not default and the whole value is repaid. These models see the changes in the credit 
quality of the obligor as market risk and concentrates just on a prediction of defaults. 
Because of this fact, according to Allen, Saunders (2002), it is better to use DM models, 
when the asset is held till the maturity and meanwhile the market value of the asset is not 
important; the credit quality deterioration is not considered for capital reserves. 
The mark-to-market models use the broader definition of the credit risk, because 
they take into account also changes in the credit quality of obligors. The models see as 
credit risk not only the default of the obligor but also a migration to a different credit 
quality class and connected change in spreads that influence the value of the loan. For this 
reason it is believed that these models track the value of the asset and predict the capital 
needs in more general manner and more precisely especially for longer maturities.   
Further there are two approaches to the default modeling. In structural approach 
models an analysis of variables influencing the default of the obligor is typically included, 
while in reduced form approach models, the most important variable is a probability of 
default and reasons for defaults are not explored. 
3.3.1 Moody’s KMV model – Credit Monitor model  
The main goal of this model is to determine the default probability of an obligor, 
which is in this model called expected default frequency (EDF). The mechanism of the 
model is based on the equivalence of a loan to a firm and option. In the comparison with 
the Merton model, which first came with this option concept, is the option logic taken from 
the exactly opposite point of view, from the firm’s side.  
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The payoff for a shareholder in a levered firm can be expressed as buying a call 
option on its assets. According to Allen, Saunders (2002) as displayed on the Figure 3.3, if 
the firm initially borrows OB and the value of their assets at the end of the period is higher 
(say OA) the firm will repay its debt and the residual value will be available for 
shareholders. On the other hand, if at the end of the period the market value of its assets 
will be lower (e.g. OC), the firm will become insolvent, the loan will not be repaid and the 
bank will loose principal as well as interest, while the shareholders will pay the downside 
limited value of their initial stake in the firm L.  
 
Figure 3.3: Equity of a levered firm as a call option on assets in the KMV model 
 
 
Source: Allen, Saunders (2002) 
 
According to this concept the position of shareholders can be seen as holding a call 
option on the assets, which can be priced in the same way as any other option, based on the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model.   
),,,),(( iAiiiAii TrBtAhE σ=  
The value of the equity depends on the market value of assets ( iA ), its volatility, the 
borrowed amount (B), rate of return (r), and the maturity of the option (T) or default 
horizon of the analysis, which is for credit risk usually taken as one year. The exercise 
price B is recommended by KMV to be measured as half of long term liabilities increased 
by all short term liabilities. As the bar denotes the observable variables, we can see that 
two variables in the one equation stay unsure. This is in the KMV model, as in Crosbie, 
0 
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   19 
 
Bohn (2003), solved by additional equation defining a link between equity and asset 
volatility21. 
 
)( iAg σσ =  
Or 
Equity volatility = Option function( iAiiiAi TrBtA ,,,),( σ ) 
Further the EDF for one borrower can be estimated based on the assumption that 
the asset value follows a log normal distribution. Some additional assumptions about its 
growth in time (or the asset value drift rate denoted as r) can be done.  
 
Figure 3.4: Asset value development and distance to default in the KMV model 
 
Source: Crosbie, Bohn (2003) 
  
According to Crosbie, Bohn (2003), there are six variables that determine the 
default probability, denoted in the Figure 3.4 by numbers, they are respectively – the 
current asset value A(0), the distribution of the asset value at the end of the period A(T), 
volatility of the asset value at T, the level of the default point B, expected growth of assets 
over the horizon and the length of the horizon T. The development of asset value and the 
distribution of the asset value at time t can be described as: 
)()2/()0(ln)(ln
)()()(
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where iW  denotes Wiener process of random changes in the firm’s assets value. 
The distance to default (DD) and EDF can be computed as follows: 
                                                 
21
 The functional form differs for different authors. 
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The KMV model advantage is that it can be easily applied on all listed firms, as it 
links the observable financial variables with default probability. For non-listed firms the 
EDF can be estimated by comparison with firms with similar rating and financial 
conditions. The biggest disadvantage, the normality assumption, can be outweighed thanks 
to the empirical EDF, which is a statistic that depicts observed default frequency as a 
function of distance to default. In this way for each firm’s distance to default an empirical 
expected default frequency, based on historical observation of firms with similar financial 
characteristics, can be found. Even if firm’s assets do not follow the log normal 
distribution, empirical results for similar firms are available in this statistics. Similar 
statistics for empirical EDF is also offered according to the standard firm’s ratings as e.g. 
from S&P.    
The bank’s expected loss will be equal to LDG times EAD times the expected 
default frequency weighted by the probability of default. Unexpected loss is for this model 
usually defined as standard deviation for two possible stages of the world, default and non-
default of an obligor. 
)1(*** PDPDLGDEADUL −=   
For n loans with weights w and correlations of defaults22 ρ: 
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3.3.2 CreditMetrics 
This mark-to-market model estimates the distribution of future value of particular 
portfolio, which can be further used for estimation of expected and unexpected loss or VaR 
for different quantiles. The downgrading and upgrading of the obligor during the life of the 
                                                 
22
 In the KMV model correlation of default of two assets is usually approximated by asset correlations. 
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loan is considered as part of credit risk, so the economic capital is estimated to cover losses 
caused by defaults as well as by other rating changes. 
 According to Saunders, Allen (2002), the CreditMetrics specialize on non-traded 
assets as loans or privately listed bonds. The model assumes that rating system contains 
one class for defaulted debtors and each obligor is assigned to one rating class according to 
clearly defined criteria. Further the probabilities of rating migrations are assumed to be 
given. Moreover for each non-default rating class there is a forward zero curve and spreads 
for each rating, while the LGD for each credit is known. 
Under these quite strict assumptions the future value of a bond (or alternatively a 
loan) after one year can be computed, based on the basic discounting by zero rates and 
spreads related to the end-of- period rating, in the following way: 
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As the first cash flow comes at the end of first year it is not discounted. The 
forward zero rate curves are derived from zero coupon risk free instruments such as 
government bonds. An example from Saunders, Allen (2002) for U.S. Treasury notes with 
semiannual coupons is following (r denotes interest rate, 20 z  is one year forward zero rate 
and 11 z  is six month zero coupon rate six month from now etc.)23: 
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Further the zero coupon rates are increased by spread required for particular rating 
class, where the borrower can end up in the one year horizon and used for computation of 
the value of the loan in one year, which are finally weighted by the probability of 
migration to this rating during the year, which can be found in credit rating migration 
matrix. The expected (mean) value in one year and a volatility of any loan can be 
computed as: 
22222 )()()()( EPpEPpEPpEPp
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23
 For credit risk the annual rates are important. 
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where p denotes the probability that an obligor will shift to a given rating class and 
P is the value of loan as discounted cash flows with relevant discount factor. The value for 
default class ( DP ) is given by recovery rate (or RR=1-LGD) as a percentage of EAD. 
For more loans the joint probabilities of migration must be calculated according to 
the individual migration matrices and correlation among obligors, which can be estimated 
econometrically according to observed sensitivities to returns in linked industries. In 
CreditMetrics Technical document (1997), there is offered the following example of 
correlation of A-rated bond of a universal bank sensitive to banking and insurance industry 
and BB-rated bond of a chemical factory sensitive to chemical industry climate. 
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The migration from one category to another is estimated based on the rate of return 
on the assets. This process should be of Markov type, which means that development of an 
obligor’s rating in the next year does not depend on its past development24. For each rating 
category the threshold values of rate of returns on assets are set according to the 
probability of such shift in the rating as on the Figure 3.525. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The test for Markovian process for transition matrices from S&P database can be found in Bangia et.al 
(2002). The test is based on the analysis of eigenvalues and eigenvectors and analysis of path dependence, 
where the eigenvalues of transition matrices for increasing time horizons must decay exponentially and the 
set of eigenvectors must be the same for matrices for different horizons. 
25
 Usually the assumption that the asset value change ( WW /∆ ) is normally distributed is accepted and the 
rate of return on assets is standardized to have zero mean and volatility one. The probabilities of rating 
changes assigned to the bond are equal to the value of cumulative standard normal distribution for the 
thresholds )( iα . Threshold levels can be computed from inverse standard normal distribution.  
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Figure 3.5: Rating change thresholds for BB rate  
 
Source: CreditMetrics Technical Document (1997) 
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The joint probabilities for correlated bonds that the first bond will be in the rating 
category x+1 and second in y+1 can be found as integral of bivariate normal distribution. 
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As soon as we know the joint migration probabilities among each two obligors as 
well as individual migration probabilities the distribution of the portfolio value, mean 
value and volatility can be estimated. Finally the CVaR can be computed. 
In the CreditMetrics model for future value of portfolio of loans, at first, based on 
the assumption of normal distribution of returns on assets, the threshold values according 
to given migration matrices are set and the correlations (ρ) are estimated for all couples of 
obligors. Further it is possible to use a Monte Carlo simulation for estimation of 
distribution of the future value of the portfolio; within the simulation a rating category is 
assigned to each obligor and the future value of the loan is computed based on discounted 
cash flows, forward zero rates and relevant spreads. 
 
AD ACCC 
 
AB 
 
ΑBBB 
 
ΑAAA 
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3.3.3 CreditRisk+ 
The CreditRisk+ is one of the models by Credit Suisse Financial Products based on 
the application of an insurance logic to the credit risk measurement. As a default mode 
model just two states of the obligor are considered, default, which is taken as continuous 
variable with some probability distribution26 and non-default. The goal of CreditRisk+ is to 
get the distribution of future losses related to a given portfolio, consisting of models for 
frequency of defaults (default probabilities) and severity of losses, in comparison to Credit 
Metrics, where changes in the portfolio’s value and VaR were the main results. In the 
CreditRisk+ changes in the credit rating are considered to be part of a market risk; just a 
narrow definition for credit risk is used. 
It is assumed that each obligor has a small probability of default and that each 
default is independent of the defaults on other loans27. The portfolio of loans is at first 
divided according to the severity of losses in case of default into bands to make the 
measure of this random variable easier. The narrower the bands the more precise will be 
the model for future losses. 
According to the Saunders, Allen (2002) the main advantage of this model is its 
simplicity and low data demand. The severity of losses together with the frequency of 
defaults relevant for given band are the only information needed for finding the 
distribution of losses connected with loans included in this band. Once we know loss 
distribution of all bands it can be summed to get the loss distribution of the whole 
portfolio.  
As discussed in the book mentioned above, according to the CSFP (1997) the loss 
distribution in CreditRisk+ is symmetric and close to normal distribution, however the both 
random variables in this model (the default frequency and loss severity) typically have 
fatter tails as they are not sTable with the economic cycle. The observed mean default 
frequency is higher than the variance, which are in this model assumed to be equal, 
because of the Poisson distribution. So the final result for the basic CreditRisk+ model is 
just approximation and for better results one more random variable of changes in the mean 
value of default frequency can be added.   
                                                 
26
 in comparison with the CreditMetrics, where default was just one of the rating classes and final rating was 
a discrete variable. 
27
 Under these assumption the probabilities of default follows Poisson distribution. 
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According to Saunders, Allen (2002) this basic CreditRisk+ model tends to 
underestimate economic capital requirement as the mean value of defaults changes with the 
economic cycle of each country, the distribution will have fatter tails and the required 
quantil of unexpected loss will be further from the mean value (i.e. from expected loss). 
Furthermore default in the bands does not seem to be independent as they will probably be 
dependent on some systematic risk factors28. 
3.3.4 Comparison of economic capital models 
Table 3.6: Comparison of economic capital models 
  
KMV CreditMetrics CreditRisk+ 
model type DM/structural MTM/structural DM/reduced 
logic of the model loans priced as 
options  
  model is similar to 
insurance ones  
What is the source of 
credit risk? 
changes in the asset 
value during one year, 
default occurs, when 
asset value fall below 
the default point 
changes in the value 
of loan due to rating 
migration connected 
with changes in the 
asset value 
default rates and severity 
of credit events 
Which data are 
required? 
data for BSM formula 
observable for listed 
companies, correlation 
of assets, exposures 
transition matrix, credit 
spreads for each 
rating class, forward 
zero yield curves, 
LGD for each loan, 
correlation among 
loans, exposures 
severity of losses in case 
of default (exposure and 
LGD), default rates, macro 
factors for more advanced 
version, where default 
frequency changes with 
the cycle 
What influences the 
probability of credit 
event? 
distance to default probability of changes 
in the rating 
default rates (considered 
to be a random variable) 
main assumptions asset value follows log 
normal distribution, 
default point is 
estimated as some 
portion of liabilities of 
the company 
transition matrix is 
sTable in time, 
correlation between 
each two loans can be 
estimated 
econometrically, rate 
of return on assets 
follow normal 
distribution 
probabilities of default 
follow Poisson distribution, 
default events are rare 
and mutually independent 
goal, main result EDF distribution of future 
value, VaR etc. 
distribution of future losses 
Source: by author 
The KMV and CreditRisk+ are default mode models, which consider the narrow 
definition of credit risk and economic capital is measured to cover losses from defaults of 
obligors. The CreditMetrics on the other hand sees also the credit migration of the obligors 
                                                 
28
 Models that link default frequency to the economic cycle (i.e. systematic risk factors) will be discussed in 
the chapter 5. 
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as part of credit risk. The KMV and CreditMetrics are structural type models, because they 
estimate changes in the value of assets and see probability of default as a result of financial 
characteristics of the firm or macroeconomic conditions. The CreditRisk+ in the basic 
version do not consider reasons for default risk, in the more advanced version the default 
risk can be linked to a development of macroeconomic variables and independence of 
defaults can be replaced by default correlations as defaults in each band will depend on 
economic cycle.  
The KMV is based on the option pricing model, which helps to price the loans and 
model the development of its price under the restrictive assumption of log normal 
distribution of asset value. The CreditRisk+ use the logic that is typical for insurance 
models considering large amount of loans with low probability of default, where default 
are independent of each other. Also here a crucial assumption of Poisson distribution of 
probabilities of default is made, which according to the empirical findings leads to 
underestimation of economic capital.   
However the CreditMetrics model leads directly to the distribution of future value 
of portfolio, which can be easily used for estimation of any CVaR quantiles, its main 
disadvantages are the data requirement as well as the assumption of normal distribution of 
asset return needed to divide obligors into the rating classes. This complexity streams from 
the type of this model, which connects the MTM approach with structural view on rating 
migration. 
For each model there exist more advanced versions that ease some of the 
assumptions and enable more sensitive modeling of credit risk capital. For example in the 
case of CreditMetrics the rating migration can be linked to the development of 
macroeconomic variables instead of assumption of its stability in time. According to the 
empirical findings as described in details in the chapter 5 the downgrading in more 
probable especially for a lower rating quality loans during the contraction, while upgrades 
are more probable during the economic expansion. Because these changes in assumptions 
are usually used for stress testing the estimated capital needs, the broad usage of these 
models in the literature will be summed in the mentioned chapter.  
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4. Methodology of credit risk stress testing 
4.1 Stages of Stress testing procedure 
The Basel II regulation CEBS (2006), impose special requirements on the 
accomplishment of stress testing program in a financial institution. At first, according to 
the mentioned document, the institution should start with an assessment of its portfolio and 
identification of risks that it is most exposed to. Further it is asked to determine those risk 
factors that are material to include them into stress testing. The identification of risks 
should be based on the analysis of the portfolio characteristics as well as on the external 
environment in which the institution is operating. Assessment of all material risk 
drivers/factors that can affect the institutions solvency, profitability or compliance with the 
regulatory requirements is key for appropriateness of the stress testing program29. The 
whole responsibility for stress testing program lies on a management body, which should 
approve scenarios as well as should be informed about the results of the stress tests and 
decide about usage of corrective measures, while individual stages of stress test can be and 
usually are delegated to institution’s departments.  
The stress testing process can be divided into two main parts, the identification of 
key factors finished with definition of a scenario as combination of changes in risk factors 
and assessment of the results and impact on the institution. According to Čihák (2007), 
once the portfolio specific risk drivers are identified the institution should define a scenario 
consisting of a shift in these factors that will fulfill the Basel II requirements and have 
economic sense considering correlations among factors as discussed further. Further the 
impact of such a scenario on the portfolio value, institution balance sheet, income 
statement and capital adequacy should be judged. Finally the management receives report 
about the whole procedure and decides if such a future development would be too adverse 
for the institution and some type of corrective measures should be applied or if the risk is 
still bearable.  
Similar description of stages of the stress testing process as summarized in the 
Consultative Paper on Credit Stress Testing (2002) follows on the Figure 4.1, where in the 
                                                 
29 The institution can decide to run hypothetical as well as historical scenarios, if they are relevant; can 
implement scenario and/or sensitivity tests as they are defined in the last part of this chapter. The stress tests 
should be repeated as frequently as necessary according to the nature of the risk drivers and their volatility. 
Further requirements on frequency of stress tests, definition of scenarios etc. are listed in the chapter 2 and 6. 
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bottom part a reassessment of the adequacy of the stress test scenario is added to adjust the 
actual scenarios to meet changes in the external environment and portfolio structure for the 
next round of stress test as it is required at least once a year under the Basel II. 
 
Figure 4.1: Flowchart for building a stress-testing program 
 
Source: Consultative Paper on Credit Stress Testing (2002) 
3.2 General framework of credit risk stress testing under pillar I and II 
Concentrating on the most technical part of the stress testing program, on the 
methods how an impact of given scenario on the institution’s portfolio value can be 
estimated, we can find a general feature among stress tests conducted under the first and 
second pillar, because all stress tests, by definition, search for a distribution of loss under 
the scenario. Such a conditional distribution of loss depends on the change in credit risk 
model parameters caused by adverse shift in risk factors considered in the scenario. The 
basic mechanism of stress can be described by following Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Estimation of conditional distribution of loss for a given scenario 
 
 
Source: based on consultation with the expert from KB and Bonti et al. (2005) 
  In spite of this similarity, the goal of stress tests under the pillar one and two 
significantly differ. According to Rodriguez, Trucharte (2007), under the first pillar the 
parameters and conditions that influence the minimum capital requirement are stressed, 
while under the second pillar it is tested whether this requirement increased by the capital 
buffer held by the institution is enough to absorb a possible adverse shock.  
More concrete is the analysis of stress tests required under the Basel II by Mager, 
Schmieder (2008), who defines the first pillar credit risk stress tests as those that denote 
adjustments to IRB parameters for stressed conditions, an assessment of their robustness 
and a periodical evaluation of the impact of an economic recession on the regulatory 
capital requirements called cyclicality stress tests. The global impact of adverse events or 
changes in market conditions on the bank’s risk profile and capital adequacy is assessed 
under the pillar two. Similar distinction is showed on the Figure 4.3 bellow. 
 
Figure 4.3: Stress tests conducted under the first and second pillar  
 
Source: Bonti et al. (2005) based on the BIS (2004) 
In a similar manner we can differentiate between tests under the first and second 
pillar according to the credit risk model used. As Mager, Schmieder (2008) further adds, 
under the former the stress tests usually search for impact of the scenario on the Basel II 
parameters such as PD, LGD, EAD, M, or asset correlations and regulatory formulas are 
Scenario describing 
changes in portfolio 
specific key risk 
factors 
 
Estimation of 
parameters of credit 
risk model based on 
the risk factors in 
scenario 
Estimation of 
conditional 
distribution of future 
loss/portfolio value 
(EL, UL, VaR) 
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used for final step of computation of expected and unexpected conditional loss. Under the 
latter the economic capital models30 are usually used, while some of their assumptions are 
changed to fit the scenario conditions.   
For both pillars the stress testing can be seen, as the arrows on the Figure 4.2 
denotes, as a two-stage problem. At first one must identify a link between the values of risk 
factors in the scenario and variables in the credit risk model, later the conditional loss must 
be computed based on the model itself.  
For example, as in Rodriguez, Trucharte (2007) under the IRB approach the effect 
of a change in the variables like unemployment rate or interest rate on mortgages, which 
are factors identified as influencing probability of default of mortgage loans to households 
can be through an econometric model linked to PDs. Further the risk weights and capital 
requirement can be computed based on the stressed parameters through the IRB 
formulas31. According to these arguments, the Figure 4.4 shows the main logic of stress 
testing methods under both pillars. 
Figure 4.4: Mechanism of credit risk stress testing under first and second pillar 
 
 
 
Source: by author based on generalization of methods used in literature mentioned in chapter 5 and 
concretization of general model on the Figure 4.2. 
                                                 
30
 The most famous economic capital models are KMV, CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and Multifactor risk 
model, which were described in the chapter 3 and chapter 5. 
31
 Chapter 5 includes more examples of stress testing methods used in current literature.   
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4.3 Possible types of scenarios 
4.3.1 Sensitivity analysis vs. Scenario stress test 
On a basic level we can distinguish two types of stress tests according to the 
number of factors included in the scenario. Firstly, sensitivity analysis, sometimes called 
univariate stress test, as defined in CEBS (2006) assesses the impact of large move in one 
risk factor on the financial conditions of the institution, where magnitude of its change is 
set based on some expert judgment. An example of sensitivity analysis can be a test for 
decline in real estate prices or increase in effective exchange rate. These tests are less 
demanding to run, can be repeated regularly and can serve as a first approximation of loss 
caused by such a movement in this risk factor or for identification of risk factors relevant 
for given portfolio.  
On the other hand this approach does not catch the effect on the loss fully. In the 
real world risk factors are interconnected by correlations and a shock in one factor will 
cause a shift in a large number of other risk factors that may be also relevant for portfolio 
loss. Such a secondary effect is omitted by this approach so the sensitivity analysis can 
underestimate real loss. This can make according to Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) a false 
impression that the shock in particular factor with a given severity is unproblematic for a 
financial institution. 
Secondly, scenario stress tests or multivariate stress tests, as mentioned in CEBS 
(2006), are more realistic, because they look for an impact of a simultaneous move in a 
number of risk drivers while the stress event causing such a movement is usually well-
defined. These tests are more complicated to run and the setting of movements in risk 
factors in a realistic way can be problematic; the correlations among factors are in some of 
these tests respected32, in others they are completely ignored.  
4.3.2 Historical and hypothetical scenarios 
As shown on the Figure 4.5 scenario tests can be further divided into those based on 
historical and hypothetical scenarios according to the way how the decision on the 
magnitude of the shock in the core risk drivers is made. In historical scenarios the risk 
                                                 
32
 For historical scenarios the correctness of correlations among factors is often met by setting all relevant 
factors according to their values during the particular past event. In hypothetical scenarios historical 
correlation can be used as well as correlation observed during stress periods. Sometimes correlations among 
factors are completely ignored, as described further. 
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factors are set according to some past crisis33. An example of historical scenario test 
considering past crisis in the Czech Republic could be a currency crisis in 1997. Such 
scenario would include increase in nominal interest rates, depreciation of home currency 
and downturn in many industries.  
Although this method takes as scenario, by definition, a plausible event, it may fail 
to capture the nature of market changes and new products that have appeared since that 
crisis, so it may not be relevant for stress testing the current portfolio for likely future 
stresses. Moreover, as commonly mentioned, the same crisis is highly improbable to 
reoccur again and most probably some different crisis than past ones will come. On the 
other hand, this method usually respects the correlations among the risk factors, because 
their values are set equal to some real past crisis ones. Further an observation of 
correlations during historical crisis can provide us useful information about the joint 
behavior of factors in stress events.  
Hypothetical scenarios rely in risk factors´ setting more than historical scenarios on 
expert judgments and usually also on some macroeconomic models34. In cases when 
                                                 
33
 In general for all risks, in BIS_CGFS (2005) we can see that stress tests often applied by large financial 
institutions are based on historical events like Asian crisis in 1997, the terrorist attack in 2001 (connected 
with interest rate and credit risk), the oil price change during the Iraque war in 2003 or the oil price shock in 
1973-74 (accompanied with some industries downturn and loss in banks loan books).   
34
 A hypothetical scenario can be for example an economic downturn expressed as a slowdown of the GDP 
growth accompanied by increase in unemployment rate and decline in real estate prices. Other hypothetical 
scenarios that were prepared by the CNB are used in chapter 7.   
Sensitivity analysis 
 
Scenario stress test Portfolio-driven approach 
 
Event-driven approach 
Historical scenario 
 
Hypothetical scenario  
Systematic 
 
Non-systematic 
EVT 
MC simulation 
Correlation 
Source: Consultative Paper on Credit Stress testing (2002) 
Figure 4.5: Types of stress test scenarios  
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macroeconomic models are not used properly, the correlations among risk factors may not 
fit the commonly observed comovements. Then it can happen that scenario defining some 
development in the market variables will loose economic sense and it will be problematic 
to explain such unusual behavior of variables. On the other hand hypothetical scenarios can 
help the institution to see new combinations of risk factors that may fit the current portfolio 
shortcomings better than any historical scenario based on a past event. 
Further according to BIS_CGFS (2005) the scenario tests can be divided into those 
arising from portfolio-driven approach and event-driven approach. In the former, a creation 
of a scenario starts with an identification of vulnerabilities in the portfolio, continues with 
searching for factors´ changes that can cause losses according to these vulnerabilities and 
ends with constructing scenario consisting of these factors. In the latter approach, the 
mechanism goes exactly the other way round; it starts with formulation of a plausible 
event, continues with its decomposition to factors that change during this event and ends 
with analyzing the effect of these changes on given portfolio.  
4.3.2.1  Systematic and non-systematic hypothetical scenarios 
Hypothetical scenarios can be differentiated according to Consultative Paper on 
Credit Stress testing (2002) based on the fact, if correlations among the risk factors are 
taken into account or not when the scenario is being defined. In this manner we can divide 
hypothetical scenarios into systematic and non-systematic. The latter do not consider 
correlations among risk factors, but set the changes in risk factors according to some 
different rule, as for example, the most adverse value for each factor that appeared during 
some period of time is taken and they are combined into one scenario. Further examples of 
this type are scenarios that contain a change in most important (core) risk factors with 
magnitude decided by experts, while other factors (peripheral) are kept constant or that 
subjective judgment on factor changes is applied, ignoring correlations among factors 
completely. 
On the other hand systematically built scenarios try to incorporate all relevant risk 
factors and use appropriate correlations among them as we can see for example in the case 
of extreme value theory, Monte Carlo simulation and other approaches that respect 
correlations. In favor of these methods speaks the fact that defining a realistic scenario is a 
core part of whole stress testing procedure. If correlations among factors are omitted and 
just a set of some arbitrary decided changes in factors is used for building a scenario, the 
link among factors is interrupted. The scenario will probably not have much economic 
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sense and results of portfolio loss analysis will not match with possible real event effect. 
There is a great discussion considering what kind of correlations should be used, (if 
historical or some other), because as shown in Kim, Finger (2000) correlations during 
stress events tend to differ from normal historical ones. But one can surely say that it is 
always better to use at least some35 type of correlations to set factor changes in realistic 
manner, because otherwise the scenario may contain such unusual comovements of factors 
that it will loose economic sense and become improbable to occur.   
Historical and special turbulent time correlations 
In more advanced methods for a scenario construction correlations among factors 
are respected not just for decision about the change in core assets but also for setting the 
peripheral factors. For this purpose historical correlations can be used as well as the 
peripheral factors can be set according to their values during the past event when core 
assets moved in the same way as in this scenario36.  
Naturally for getting as precise result for loss as possible we should set the 
peripheral factors so that they will follow the natural co-movements with core assets; only 
in this way secondary effect on loss will be analyzed correctly. The question is what kind 
of correlations should be used, historical or some special ones conditional on stress events, 
because historical correlations according to Consultative Paper on Credit Stress testing 
(2002) tend to break down in turbulent times, and if such a conditional correlations are 
used, will the results change significantly. 
To address this problem, we can see Kim, Finger (2000), where stress tests results 
using conditional correlations on turbulent times can be compared to those with historical 
unconditional correlations. At first bivariate normal distribution parameters were estimated 
based on all data in given period (unconditional parameters), then the data were divided 
into two groups; for quiet and hectic periods; and conditional parameters of two 
multivariate normal distributions were estimated (for core x and peripheral assets y)37.  
                                                 
35
 Deeper discussion on the possible types of correlations for building stress scenario will follow further.  
36
 For example, if we want to create a scenario containing 3% decrease in GDP accompanied by 4% increase 
in unemployment, we can search for the same situation in the past and set peripheral factors as they were that 
year.  
37
 In Kim, Finger (2000) the risk factors are called assets, the core assets are market factors for which the 
magnitude and duration of stress is set in the scenario and peripheral assets are other factors, that are set 
according to correlations with stressed factors. 
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Figure 4.6: Goodness of fit – one normal vs. mixture of two normal distributions 
 
Source: Kim, Finger (2000) 
In the application on a return on S&P index used in the mentioned paper the 
combination of these two multivariate normal distributions fit real data distribution better 
than the single bivariate distribution for all data (Figure 4.6). Further the hypothesis that 
correlations for calm and turbulent times are the same is rejected; the correlations are 
proofed to differ for these two subsets. Finally a stress is applied on core assets in the 
magnitude of -3σ, while peripheral assets are set in the following four ways;  
 zeroed-out38,  
 according to their values when core assets changed in the same way 
in the past (historical approach), 
 according to unconditional correlations (predictive stress test),  
 according to conditional correlations based on hectic periods (called 
broken arrow approach).  
                                                 
38
 Set so that returns on peripheral assets are equal to zero. 
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The drawbacks for each method and more details on the setting of peripheral assets 
are described in Table 4.7. 
 
 Table 4.7: Benefits and drawbacks of different methods of setting peripheral assets 
stress test 
return on peripheral 
assets benefit drawback 
zeroed-out zero return implementation is quite 
easy 
ignoring co-movements is 
unrealistic 
predictive expected return based 
on correlation 
idiosyncratic errors are 
averaged out 
correlation is calculated in 
the normal situation 
historical actual return of the 
specific historical data 
the stress situation is 
easily incorporated 
idiosyncratic errors of the 
historical event cannot be 
removed 
Source: Kim, Finger (2000) 
 
Kim, Finger (2000) concludes that version with zeroed-out peripheral assets 
underestimate portfolio loss, while broken arrow approach, because of higher estimated 
conditional correlations for turbulent periods than unconditional correlation for all data in 
this example, gives higher estimate of loss for all quantiles than if we use unconditional 
correlations.  
Here, the resulting loss depend heavily on the correlations used, while correlations 
among factors or assets significantly differ for calm and turbulent times and the 
combination of two multivariate distributions based on conditional correlations fits real 
data better than unconditional distributions. At least in this case we can conclude that for 
better prediction of loss distribution during turbulent time, conditional correlations should 
be used.  
4.3.3 Worst-case scenarios 
 
As already mentioned the stress tests should use scenarios describing rare but 
plausible situation, by which the portfolio value can be significantly hit. Both these 
conditions are highlighted by Breuer, Krenn (2001), who introduce a theoretical 
methodology, how to search for a scenario that would be plausible, cause significant losses 
to the portfolio and have economic sense.  
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The portfolio special worst-case scenario according to this paper can be defined 
based on an assumption on the distribution of risk factors` changes, on their correlations 
and on the level of scenario plausibility the institution wants to include into their stress 
testing program. As mentioned, the managers should always define which plausibility level 
is relevant for stress testing, in other words, up to how rare market events the institution 
wants to run stress tests, or decide case by case if a given scenario should be included into 
stress testing procedure, otherwise the results of a stress test using more improbable 
scenario than those accepted by management will not give credible result that could 
motivate them to decide about changes in the portfolio structure or other risk-lowering 
corrective measures.  
A possible measure of plausibility of a scenario introduced here is a distance of 
factors´ values under the actual market conditions to those in a scenario situation 
(respecting given correlation structure of factors). Under the assumption of normal 
distribution of risk factor changes and given plausibility level p, we can find a  
multidimensional domain, where all such a plausible scenarios are located39. 
 
Let’s assume that n risk factors ),,,( 21 nrrrr K= have a significant impact on the portfolio. 
The difference of scenario from the current market situation can be expressed as: 
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Then under the assumption of normal distribution of risk factor changes, all scenarios of 
risk factors r with given plausibility level p form an ellipsoid41: 
                                                 
39
 For example if an institution decides that it wants to include in its stress testing  99 % of market situations, 
then it will search along the ellipse, outside which lie 1 % of less probable market situations, for the 
combination of factors with the worst impact on institution. 
40
 The correlation among factors as mentioned in Breuer, Krenn (2000) can be ether historical or stress 
correlation as introduced by Kim, Finger (2000). 
41
 For definitions of domains for other distributions od risk factors like t-distribution with thicker tails than 
under normal distribution see Breuer and Krenn (2001). 
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Where admissibility domain can be defined as all scenarios inside and on this ellipsoid and 
k denotes size of the ellipsoid, because its axes are proportional to k.  
 
For a special case of only two risk factors as in Čihák (2007) we can depict the 
scenarios with the same plausibility as an ellipse, which shape depends on the correlation 
between these two factors (see Figure 4.8). The larger the ellipse the less plausible the 
scenario is, intuitively because the larger change in factors form current market situation is 
needed to reach this scenario. In the Figure 4.8 we can further find lines that connect 
market situations with the same impact on the institution (for example on its capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR), profitability or other important measures), these lines do not need to 
be linear42. The further the line from the origin the more adverse is the effect on the 
institution. 
 
Figure 4.8: Searching for extremes under worst-case and threshold approach   
 
 
Source: Čihák (2007) 
   
According to this Figure we can define two possible approaches how to deal with 
the optimization problem for searching for a portfolio specific worst case scenario43. The 
                                                 
42
 depending on the combinations of the factors´ changes that will cause the same adverse impact on the 
institution.  
43
 As highlighted by Breuer, Krenn (2001), even though we work with worst case scenario, we do not search 
for a scenario with worst impact on the institution, because results of such a stress test would not be useful 
Shock to Risk 
factor 2 
Shock to risk factor 1 
p=1 % 
p=2 % p=5 % 
CAR decrease 
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worst-case approach searches for a scenario that has the most adverse impact on the 
portfolio value or institution Figures for a given level of plausibility (shift along given 
ellipse). On the other hand threshold approach selects the given adverse impact and looks 
for the most plausible scenario (for an ellipse with the highest plausibility that touches the 
line with the given adverse impact).  
More concrete facts on general methods for systemic search for worst case 
scenarios can be found in Breuer, Krenn (2000). The easiest method, so called factor push, 
use n-dimensional cuboids, which are inscribed into ellipsoids described above, but enable 
to find worst case scenarios just in corners of these cuboids. Further more general 
maximization algorithms like multidimensional simplex method and simultaneous 
annealing are described. However these methods can find extremes with much higher 
probability than factor push method, their algorithm is much more complicated.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
for management of the institution, and such a scenario often can not be found as some portfolios do not have 
limited downside loss, but we always work with some plausibility level. 
   40 
 
5. Stress testing techniques – examples from the literature 
Once the scenario is defined, it must be translated into the credit risk model as 
denoted by the first arrow on the Figure 4.2 and 4.4. This is usually done by an additional 
model that conditions the development or setting of some of the variables from credit risk 
model on the scenario, to be able to incorporate changes in the risk factors into the credit 
model.  
The most intuitive example of scenario describing changes in macroeconomic risk 
factors or shocks to some special parts of portfolio can be implemented into the model 
through a regression based model that will estimate sensitivities of the credit risk model 
input variables on the cycle. Further some assumptions of the credit risk model itself can 
be eased to make it more realistic and enable it to react to the scenario. In that case an 
assumption of some input variable being constant or developing in with some trend is 
changed to make it dependent on the scenario risk factors, as for example in a case of 
linking the transition matrices to the cycle.   
In general we can divide scenarios according to the Consultative Paper on Credit 
Stress Testing (2002) to those describing change in: 
• counterparty’s behavior like deterioration in overall PDs, LGDs, spreads 
• environmental changes like changes in economic or regulatory conditions, 
specific industry or region downturn, political changes 
• analytics and model assumptions such as change in correlations, transition 
matrices and other assumptions of the credit risk models 
The methods that are commonly used for implementation of these stress scenarios 
into the credit risk models are explained further.  
 
5.1 Approaches to stressing the PDs and asset correlations 
The PDs are inputs into the Basel II minimum capital requirement formulas as well 
as to credit risk models like CreditMetrics or CreditRisk+. In stress testing scenarios they 
are mostly made dependent on a macroeconomic development expected and on changes in 
obligor specific characteristics44. This is usually done as in Rösch, Scheule (2004) by 
                                                 
44
 Sometimes a additional model that links the PDs or also the asset correlations to the scenario conditions is 
not used as found in some of the Czech banks, in which the stress testing program is not so developed yet. In 
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application of a one factor model or as in Hamerle et al. (2004) by using a multifactor 
version, which enables better differentiation of obligors and to assign them different values 
of PDs. In both these papers the historical time series of PDs as a dependent variable is 
approximated by some similar variable like a chargeoff rate or insolvency rate 
respectively, because there are usually not enough data available on the original series.  
The factor models are typical threshold models (see also Merton-type credit risk 
models in the chapter 3) that see default as a situation, when value of assets decrease under 
some threshold (default point), which can depend on the business cycle in more advanced 
versions of this model45.  According to Hamerle et al. (2004) the multifactor model with a 
sTable default point can be described as follows: 
If a logarithmic return on an obligor’s assets itr  fall below the threshold itc  a default 
occurs (the indicator of default 1=ity ; 0 otherwise): 
1=⇔≤ ititit ycr         
where the logarithmic return on assets is dependent on a time lagged obligor 
specific risk drivers 1, −tiX 46, systematic risk factor 1−tz  and other risk factor explaining risk 
factors )1,0(~ Nf t  not captured by the model47. It is assumed that obligors in one risk 
segment (such as in the same industry) have the same risk factors and the same exposures 
to them. 
ittttiit ubfzXr ωγββ ++++= −− 1´1,´0  
Then conditional probabilities of default under the assumption that the obligor did 
not default before and given the realization of tf  can be expressed as: 
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these cases the shifts in PDs are set arbitrarily or the changes in PDs prepared within the CNB stress testing 
program for macroeconomic scenario predictions for the next year are used in some way.      
45
 In this case the threshold itc would depend on macroeconomic variables and vary through the cycle as in 
Rösch, Scheule (2004). 
46
 Here a one year lags are used, but sometimes other lags like multiples of quarters of the years etc. can be 
used according to frequency of the data that are used for PD approximation as in Jakubík, Schmieder (2008). 
47
 The one factor model uses just one specific (idiosyncratic) and one systematic (common) risk factor. 
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where 
ω
ββ 00~ −= itc and ω
ββ −=~  etc. 
The conditional PDs for logit and probit model respectively are dependent on the 
risk factors included in the model: 
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Φ
 denotes standard normal distribution function. Further a correlation for one risk 
industry and for two risk industries m and l can be derived as well as default correlation 
among obligors48. All parameters can be estimated according to the maximum likelihood 
method. In some papers the computation of default and asset correlation is not needed 
thanks to the Monte-Carlo simulation49.  
 A classical application of this model in Rodriguez, Trucharte (2007) on Spanish 
mortgage portfolio of banks shows a logistic regression model for PD as dependent on 
macroeconomic variables and loan specific characteristics. In this paper after an estimation 
of the regression parameters a Monte Carlo simulation is used to find the loss distribution 
of the portfolio under normal conditions. Further a stress scenario is built, in this case 
based on historical volatilities or values of parameters during the worst year in the sample. 
                                                 
48
 According to Hamerle et al. (2004) the asset correlations for one risk segment and different risk segments 
(industries) can be derived as: 
   
  
And default correlation dependent on the same parameters can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
49
 In some papers like Mager, Schmieder (2008) an alternative scenario is prepared, where the link between 
PDs and asset correlations is interrupted to see how much their dependency influence the stress test results.  
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Relevant values of explanatory variables are used in regression and by repeating the same 
method a conditional loss distribution is found50. 
Further the model can be used for more advanced analysis as in Rösch, Scheule 
(2007) and Rösch, Scheule (2004), where a point-in-time and through-the-cycle setting of 
PDs51 and asset correlations is defined and the impact of different settings of the parameter 
on the result for loss distribution is highlighted. In general it is concluded that point-in-
time setting leads to lower estimates of asset correlation and higher standard error for 
intercept from the regression, which means higher VaR and broader loss distribution. 
Comparison of the four versions of the model, which take into account different 
number of factors, based on data on insolvency rates from Germany is done by Hamerle et 
al. (2004). A most simple model, where all obligors are seen as from one segment, their 
PDs are driven only by firm specific factors and asset correlation are the same for all 
obligors, is found to be significantly less accurate than a model including also the 
systematic risk drivers. When two similar models including also the sector specification of 
the obligors are compared, the model with systematic factor included is again significantly 
better. From comparison of models with and without segmentation, it can not be decided 
which one is better. The inclusion of macroeconomic variables in the model for PDs and 
asset correlations decreases the variance of the forecasts.  
 
5.2  Simulation of recovery rates and their correlation with default probability 
Not just the PDs, but also loss given default (LGD) should according to empirical 
evidence depend on systematic risk factor and vary during the cycle52. As explained in 
Frye (2000) the recession can have impact on both default frequency and recovery rates 
that should be, based on a basic intuition, negatively correlated. Economic recession will 
lead to an increase in PDs and financial distress of many obligors. Banks will try to sell the 
assets that were used as collaterals on the market. The supply will become higher than 
demand for these assets and their value of further decrease; the LGD will increase. In Frye 
                                                 
50
 In most of the papers the LGD is not stressed, but kept constant also under stress according on some of 
Basel II prescribed values. The model described here could be according to Rösch, Scheule (2007) adjusted 
to a model of cycle dependent LGD. More on recovery rates simulation will be covered in the section 5.2.  
51
 Under point-in-time approach the parameters are set according to current economic situation and may vary 
through the cycle. The through-the-cycle approach sets the parameters equal to their average or worst value 
(Saunders, Allen (2003)) during the cycle. 
52
 Because both of the variables depend on the systematic risk factor they should be correlated. 
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(2000) there is offered an evidence that the lower is the LGD of a loan the higher is its 
sensitivity to the systematic risk factor and the higher is the loss in economic downturns. 
The same holds for PDs of the obligors. 
As Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) highlight the most common credit pricing 
models do not take into account changes in the LGD during the cycle, but assume that it is 
a constant parameter or a stochastic variable that is always independent of PD as analyzed 
on the Table 5.1. They introduce an empirical analysis for bond portfolio to compare 
estimated credit risk under three possibilities of the parameter setting. Within the first two 
models the recovery rates are assumed to be deterministic and stochastic, without any 
correlation with PDs. In the third model the most realistic setting is used; the recovery rates 
are simulated as stochastic and partially correlated with defaults. 
 
Table 5.1: Treatment of LGD within credit risk models 
Model Treatment of LGD 
Relationship between recovery 
rates (RR) and PD 
CreditMetrics Stochastic variable (beta distr.) RR independent from PD 
CreditRisk+ Constant RR RR independent from PD 
KMV  Stochastic variable RR independent from PD 
Source: Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001) 
 
In both papers mentioned above it is concluded that the assumption of constant or 
stochastic LGD without any correlation with PDs leads to a significant underestimation of 
expected and unexpected loss. Linking both of these variables with the systematic factors 
would lead to higher procyclical fluctuations in the capital needs estimated due to positive 
correlation between PD and LGD that would better fit the real development of banks` 
portfolio loss during the cycle. 
       5.3 Stress tests incorporating portfolio concentration risk 
According to Mager, Schmieder (2008) the stress test scenarios can be divided into 
those with the effect on the whole portfolio such as severe recession and other 
macroeconomic changes, to country or industry specific downturns and name-by-name 
deteriorations in credit quality. The latter two specific tests are usually connected with the 
goal to analyze high exposures to certain clients, few highly correlated industries or 
regions in the context of concentrations in the portfolio. The concentration on one side can 
be very logical as specialization on particular industry or product can increase bank’s 
profitability. On the other side if the portfolio is not enough diversified and the industries 
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or countries with high concentration are hit by the crisis the bank can experience severe 
loss. Once the crisis spreads the bank can start to change the portfolio structure and shift of 
exposure from low to higher rated clients, which is usually observed during the stress 
periods, can also lead to higher concentrations in the portfolio. 
Both single name and sector concentrations in the portfolio and its impact on loss 
distribution are analyzed in Rodriguez, Trucharte (2008). Here at first the classical factor 
model is used for estimation of individual Basel II parameters under the stress conditions. 
Further, during the simulation of loss distribution by Monte Carlo method, particular 
restrictions are imposed on the portfolio structure. The tests are run for single name 
concentration in the portfolio as well as for sector concentration53, in both cases the rest of 
the portfolio exposure is either randomly or proportionally distributed among other 
obligors.  
As highlighted in the paper it is important to test an increase in concentration in the 
portfolio together with an adverse macroeconomic scenario, to see the effect of the crisis 
on the clients that the bank could be most exposed to. Because portfolio with concentration 
in few industries that will appear to be negatively correlated in the stress time or are low 
sensitive to changes in the economic environment do not need to lead to a higher credit risk 
for a bank. 
Alternative specification how concentration risk as well as economic stress scenario 
can be incorporated into the stress testing is offered in Bonti et al. (2005). The joint 
distribution of systematic risk factors is at first found for different industries or regions. 
Further a joint distribution of factors is simulated based on the changes in the particular 
industry according to the scenario, while correlations between industries are fully 
respected. Finally the portfolio loss is estimated by Monte Carlo simulation considering 
just those simulations satisfying the specified factor changes.  
 More concrete, Bonti et al. (2005) assumes a link between economic variables 
stressed and systematic risk drivers for each industry; in the paper the systematic risk 
drivers for each industry are taken as its stock indexes. For an example of scenario of a 
decline in automotive industry of at least two percent the rest of the distribution is cut off 
and the impact on other industries is simulated according to their correlations as depicted 
                                                 
53
 In the model for sector name concentration the name concentration must also be specified to see the effect 
of both of them on the portfolio loss. 
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on the Figure 5.2. Based on the joint distribution of factors the portfolio losses are 
estimated by Monte Carlo simulation.  
Finally a more dynamic approach is introduced that takes into account changes in 
the portfolio structure during the stress situation and tries to incorporate the concentration 
risk that can arise due to default of certain part of the obligors into the loss estimation.  
 
Figure 5.2: Histogram for automotive and chemical stock index for non-stress and 
stress cases 
 
 
   Source: Bonti et al. (2005) 
5.4 Migration matrices 
Migration matrices containing probabilities of transition from the initial to the final 
rating are one of the inputs into the mark-to-market types of credit risk models like 
CreditMetrics. They are an alternative to the concept of probability of default in default 
mode models that take into account just two possible stages of the world, default and non-
default. On the other hand in mark-to-market models all possibilities of rating migration 
are considered as part of credit risk. 
In general we can see the migration matrix as more general concept in comparison 
the probability of default. The data in migration matrix for a period T provide an 
information about the probability with which an obligor with given initial rating at the 
beginning of the period will end up with some final rating at time T. According to Bangia 
(2002) a one year migration matrix, which is mostly used for credit portfolio models, 
Automotive industry (no stress) Chemicals histogram (no stress) 
Automotive histogram (stress case) Chemicals histogram (stress case) 
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contains in rows data on probability of being at particular grade at time T+1 given the 
initial rating at time T. The sum of probabilities in each row of migration matrix must sum 
up to one to give a full description of rating distribution for all firms. 
 
Figure 5.3: Structure of a migration matrix 
 
Source: Bangia et al. (2002) 
 
Further there can be found typical characteristics of the migration matrices such as 
that the lower is the initial grade the higher is the probability of shift to default grade, that 
“no migration” is the most probable final rating for all initial ratings and second probable 
is a shift to some rating next to the diagonal. The further the combination of grades from 
diagonal the lower is the probability of occurrence54. 
  Technically, one can assign a rating to an obligor based on the return on its assets 
and threshold values for each rating grade as described in the chapter 3.3.2, the joint 
migration matrices can be derived from multivariate normal distribution of asset returns 
and correlations between each two assets. Servigny, Renault (2002) offers formulas for 
computing all probabilities of transition in individual migration matrix based on real data 
observed as well as joint probabilities and shows, based on the joint empirical migration 
matrix, how an implied asset correlation can be derived55. 
                                                 
54
 For further typical characteristics of migration matrices see Bangia et al. (2002) and CreditMetrics model 
in chapter 3.  
55
 Further an approximation of asset correlations by equity correlations is criticized. This concept is 
commonly used in CreditMetrics model, but according to Servigny, Renault (2002) they are not a sufficient 
proxy and neither a broader theory introduced by Zeng, Zhang (2002) that asset correlation should depend on 
equity correlations as well as on a volatility of risk-less interest rate give according to their paper better 
results.    
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Bangia et al. (2002) offers evidence that migration matrices do not stay the same 
during the extreme events56. First they estimate unconditional rating transition matrices and 
two conditional ones for economic expansion and contraction. Then it is shown that matrix 
for expansion significantly differs from the one for contraction, when the probability of 
default or downgrading is much higher. These two conditional matrices fit better the real 
transitions than the unconditional one. Finally these findings are used for stress testing 
within CreditMetrics model.  
Under the expectation that next year will be a contraction and relevant transition 
matrix is used, Bangia et al. (2002) find a significantly different future distribution of 
portfolio value that has longer left tail and more probable values under mean. This means 
that using sTable unconditional migration matrices can lead to underestimation of losses 
under extreme events. As the relevant quantiles of the distribution of future value of the 
portfolio will be much further from the mean, the loss for given significance level will be 
underestimated under the unconditional transition matrix. 
Similar analysis is run by Servigny, Renault (2002), who accepts the result of 
Bangia et al. (2002) and tries to separate the effect of change in univariate default 
probability and change in correlations with the cycle on the portfolio loss. It concludes that 
both of these components cause changes in conditional migration matrix and are relevant 
for portfolio loss distribution. The change in correlations due to recession influences the 
right tail of this distribution while the change in default probabilities affects the center of 
the distribution.  
5.5  Regression-based transition probabilities 
Except of conditioning the migration matrices on the recession and expansion, a 
classical assumption of stability of this matrix over time and types of borrowers in 
CreditMetrics model can be changed by linking the transitions probabilities directly to the 
changes in macroeconomic variables. This can be seen as an alternative to the model 
described in the section 5.1 for probabilities of default of obligors. 
As described in Saunders, Allen (2002) the same probit or logit model can be 
developed for the element of the transition matrix describing the probability of shift from 
rating C to rating D, or alternatively for shift from any initial rating grade to default grade. 
                                                 
56
 The same is found by Nickell et al. (2001) who use a probit model to estimate the dependence of transition 
probabilities on the industry, country of the obligor and stage of the business cycle. The latter turns out to be 
most significant for changes in transition probabilities and will be discussed in the section 5.5. 
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The given probability depends on a set of systematic risk factors jitX − (or macroeconomic 
factors) and two random values that describe shock to macroeconomic conditions itε and 
random shocks to economic system tV . 
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In this model at first significant macroeconomic variables and their historical time 
series are found and model parameters are estimated. Further the series evolution is 
determined and based on the simulation of random variables the future default probabilities 
for each industry and initial rating can be estimated. Such simulated PDs can be compared 
to the unconditional sTable historical alternatives. If the simulated probability is higher 
than the unconditional probability of default the classical VaR using the latter would be 
underestimate the credit risk of the portfolio, there is a recession expected and the 
migration matrix should be adjusted so that the shifts to lower ratings will be more 
probable57. A migration adjustment ratio defined as a ratio of simulated and unconditional 
PD is defined for each period, being larger than one if there should be according to next 
year simulated scenario a shift of probabilities in the transition matrix to the right 
(downgrades should be more likely than in unconditional matrix) and lower otherwise. 
Finally the unconditional matrix elements that describe probability of shift to 
default grade can be adjusted by multiplication by this adjustment ratio; other elements 
being adjusted according to the diffusion parameters. As soon as a transition matrix 
different for each year according to the simulated effects is obtained a cycle-sensitive VaR 
for each year can be estimated by CreditMetrics method described in 3.3.2.  
Stress test can be run by using an extreme recession during the estimation of PDs 
for some or all industries/countries that would cause a significant increase in the elements 
in the right part of the migration matrix and influence the VaR estimated for that year.   
     
 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Because there are not any more just PDs but also probabilities of shifts to other rating grades in the 
migration matrix and sum of elements in rows of each matrix must be equal to one a special diffusion 
parameter dependent on the adjustment ratio is defined in this model to adjust the other row elements in the 
migration matrix.  
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Table 5.4: Summary of stress testing approaches 
Paper/authors area of survey message of the paper 
Rösch, Scheule (2004) 
effect of PDs and asset correlation on 
the loss distribution, models with 
different level of segmentation among 
sectors for: 
•constant PDs and Basel II correlations 
•constant PDs and estimated correlations 
•time-varying PDs and estimated 
correlations 
asset correlations higher under Basel II 
than observed one, inclusion of variables 
related to the cycle decrease uncertainty 
of estimates and improves estimates of 
loss distribution and economic capital, 
correlations depend on same factors as 
PDs and should be modeled 
simultaneously 
Hamerle et al. (2004)  
models of PDs driven only by firm 
specific risk factors or also by 
systematic risk factors for versions with 
or without sector segmentations and 
asset correlations included 
From comparison of models with and 
without segmentation otherwise same, it 
is not clear which one is better. 
Inclusion of macroeconomic variables in 
the model for PDs and asset correlations 
decreases the variance of the forecasts.  
Rodriguez, Trucharte 
(2007)  
logistic regression for PDs based on 
macroeconomic variables and loan 
characteristics, stress test for worst-case 
scenario 
identification of systematic and 
idiosyncratic variables significant for 
mortgage portfolio PDs and stress 
testing exercise 
Rösch, Scheule (2007) 
stress tests for scenarios based on PDs 
trough the cycle and point in time 
setting and stress of regression 
coefficients according to their standard 
errors 
larger standard errors for point in time 
regression coefficients, cause more 
severe stress, higher VaR and expected 
loss 
Frye (2000)  makes the LGD cycle dependent and 
analyze impact for final loss distribution  
theories why LGD change with the cycle 
and analysis of correlation between 
LGD and PD and their impact on loss 
distribution 
Altman, Resti and 
Sironi (2001)  
analysis of approaches to LGD 
modeling by different credit risk models, 
compares model with LGD constant or 
stochastic without correlation with PD 
and model with cycle dependent LGD 
and correlated with PD 
The first two models significantly 
underestimate expected and unexpected 
loss. Cycle dependent parameters lead to 
higher procyclical fluctuations in the 
capital needs estimated. 
Bangia (2002) 
credit migration matrix analysis, 
comparison of unconditional and 
conditional migration matrix and 
example of its usage in CreditMetrics 
conditional and unconditional migration 
matrices are significantly different and 
conditional fits better real development 
of losses. During contraction the 
distribution of future value under 
conditional matrix has longer left tail 
and more probable values under mean 
Servigny, Renault 
(2002)  
method of estimation of elements of 
migration matrix and asset correlation 
based on observed migrations, isolation 
of effect of change of univariate default 
probability and correlation with the 
cycle 
change in correlation influence right tail 
of loss distribution, while the latter 
influence the center of the distribution 
Nickell et al. (2001) 
a probit model to estimate the 
dependence of transition probabilities on 
the industry, country of the obligor and 
stage of the business cycle 
business cycle is most significant for 
changes in transition probabilities 
Saunders, Allen 
(2002) 
model of cycle dependency of elements 
of migration matrix 
method how matrix elements under 
stress can be determined and how to 
adjust the migration matrix  
Source: by author 
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6. Stress testing practice at mayor Czech Banks - with a focus on a 
loan book credit risk stress testing 
 In the following part I will introduce results of my research in five banks in the 
Czech Republic, which was focused on the loan book credit risk. During the survey I 
visited a credit risk management department in each of these banks and asked for facts on 
the two main topics. Firstly, information about credit rating systems used and main 
characteristics of regulatory and economic capital models built in the banks were collected; 
secondly, stress testing methods for loan book credit risk and sophistication of scenarios 
applied in these institutions were surveyed.  
There was a great trade-off between receiving interesting and exceptional details 
about methods used and risk that I will cover some information that are crucial for the 
banks´ know-how that would lead to a loss of interview, so the questions covered were 
primarily prepared in such a way that they mostly ask for the facts that do not need to be 
kept in secret, but are contributive for the research, leaving up to the interviewed expert, 
how detailed his answer will be. (The Tables 6.1 and 6.2 compare answers to the questions 
covered during each interview which can be found in the appendix 1). 
The main goal of the survey is to cover following three research questions: 
 Are Czech banks influenced in their credit risk stress testing framework by their 
parents or the supervisory institution, beyond the regulatory rules? 
 Do the credit risk stress testing techniques and scenarios vary across the Czech 
banking sector considerably and if they do, how and why? 
 Did the credit risk stress testing techniques/scenarios/usage change considerably 
before or since the crisis started? 
The answers heavily depend on the information received during the interviews, 
which I have to assume to be true, because mostly there are no public sources available for 
their verification. Just part of the facts and basic information about the institutions can be 
checked in the annual reports. 
 
6.1 Characteristics of the banks in the sample  
In the surveyed sample there are three out of four banks that are according to the 
Czech National Bank measure included in a group of large banks; Česká spořitelna further 
denoted as CS, Komerční banka denoted as KB and the UniCredit Bank. Further in the 
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sample there is one medium-sized bank that wanted to stay anonymous (lets call it Bank A) 
and one branch of an international bank (the ING). 
 
6.2 Key aspects of the credit risk quantification 
 In all of the surveyed banks the ratings assigned to a client from corporate sector 
depend on quantitative as well as qualitative factors. As the quantitative aspects client’s 
financial statement Figures (like assets turnover or other economic ratios, indebtedness, 
profitability, etc.) are analyzed, while in the qualitative part soft factors like actual market 
position, future opportunities and threats, market share, regulation in the client’s industry 
are considered.  
The factors included and the weights in the rating function differ among the banks, 
but the basic methodology stays the same; given factors´ values are plugged into the rating 
function and according to the points received the calibrated PD values are assigned to each 
client. The historical series used for the calibration of the PDs differs from 3 years in the 
UniCredit Bank to 7 years in the KB58. The regulatory limit according to CNB decree 
123/2007 and 282/2008 is 5 years for application for the IRB foundation approach (or 3 
years in special cases). 
The quantitative part is crucial for the final client’s rating, while the qualitative one 
is used for an adjustment to get a final rating that will according to the experts in the bank 
fit more precisely the credit risk of a particular client59. The ratio of these two parts 
according to the received answers differs from 9:1 in the Bank A to less than 3:1 in the 
UniCredit Bank.  
The number of parameters estimated for each client corresponds to the rating 
method used. The UniCredit Bank uses for the corporate clients the Standardized method 
with IRB foundation approach for some parts of this segment. The CS and the Bank A 
applies the IRB foundation60 for all corporate clients and in the KB all clients, either retail 
                                                 
58
 In the KB this length of period is kept constant; each time the data from last seven years is used to keep the 
calibrated values as actual as possible. 
59
 As the decree CNB 123/2007 and 282/2008 desires all clients must be divided into rating classes according 
to well-defined rating criteria for each class to be treated equally. But in some special situations it allows to 
use an expert judgment about the client rather then the pure rating system inputs.   
60
 Even though the CS uses the IRB foundation they estimate for the corporate clients more parameters, 
which are used just for their internal models.   
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or corporate, are assessed according to the IRB advanced approach as well as in the ING, 
which specializes only on corporate clients61.    
 The retail portfolio clients get ratings according to the weighted values of few 
characteristics, usually considering socio-demographic and economic facts (like age, 
education, disposable income, other loans taken etc.). The valuation is more quantitative 
and more automated than for clients from corporate sector, where banks use more case by 
case treatment. The UniCredit Bank, as the only one from the sample, do not assign PDs to 
the retail clients62, the Bank A reported to use the Standardized method and other banks in 
the sample use IRB advanced.  
 In those institutions, where IRB foundation for retail or IRB advanced are used, 
also other Basel II parameters for capital requirement formulas must be estimated by 
internal system63. The LGD is according to the answers estimated in the CS, the KB and 
the ING as the CNB decree requires based on the product and the transaction specific 
characteristics.  
For the credit risk measurement it is important not just to assign a rating when a 
credit to the client is approved, but also follow changes in the clients characteristics that 
are key for his ability to repay the debt. In the Czech Republic clients` rating is usually 
automatically changed, when he stops to meet his obligations; otherwise corporate clients 
are checked at least once a year according to their annual reports or more frequently in the 
case of some suspicion64. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 Because the ING has only a branch in the Czech Republic and as such it has a strong interconnection with 
the parent bank, the same credit rating system was developed centrally and is applied on a global basis.  
62
 According to information received during the interview, the retail clients are divided into three groups; 
those to whom a loan is approved, not approved and those that should be checked further. This type of 
system was called by the UniCredit Bank expert a traffic light rating system. 
63
 CNB decree 123/2007 and 282/2008 
64
 The rating checking is usually done by a special department in the bank manually at least once a year as 
the decree 123/2007 and 282/2008 calls for to keep the integrity of clients´ credit rating system. Only in the 
Bank A there was received information about special software that makes the rating checking for corporate 
clients automatically and warns in cases of some significant adverse changes.  
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Table 6.1: Summary of answers from respondents about credit risk rating system 
  information on credit rating system 
  rating method used factors considered for rating (PD) 
monitoring of client for possible 
changes in rating  
  corporate retail corporate retail 
factors 
considered for 
rating (LGD) 
length of data 
series for 
calibration Back testing PD LGD  
CS 
IRB 
foundation* 
IRB 
advanced 
according to 
Figures from 
financial 
statements and 
expert qualitative 
part 
demographic 
and economic 
factors 
characteristics 
connected with 
particular product  *** *** 
monthly for retail and 
once a year for 
corporate (or more 
often in case of 
suspicion of 
downgrading) ***  
KB 
IRB 
advanced** 
IRB 
advanced** 
according to 
Figures from 
financial 
statements and 
expert qualitative 
part 
behavioural + 
scoring 
connected with 
particular product 
and historical 
experience with 
enforcement of 
repayment 
min.5 years  
(max.7 years) 
once a year (if 
differences 
detected 
possible to 
change the 
calibration) 
at least once a year 
(in case of suspicion 
more often) each month  
UniCredit 
Bank 
standardized 
(+IRB 
foundation 
for some 
segments of 
clients) 
traffic light 
approach (no 
PD) 
external ratings or 
quantitative and 
qualitative part if 
IRB foundation 
applied 
do not 
estimate PD 
do not estimate 
LGD 
3 years  
(for part of 
portfolio 
where PD is 
estimated) once a year monthly 
do not 
estimate 
LGD  
Bank A 
IRB 
foundation Standardized 
according to 
Figures from 
financial 
statements and 
expert qualitative 
part 
behavioural + 
scoring 
do not estimate 
LGD 
5 years or 
more once a year 
at least once a year 
(but has a special 
automated software 
for more often 
clients´ monitoring) ***  
ING 
IRB 
advanced no retail 
quantitative and 
qualitative part no retail 
characteristics 
connected with 
particular product  
5 years or 
more once a year once a year once a year  
*but LGD, CCF and effective maturity are estimated for internal purposes       
**subsidiaries have IRB foundation         
***information was not provided         
Source: by author based on answers of interviewed representatives 
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6.3 Stress testing at the mayor Czech banks 
According to the decree of CNB 123/2007 and 282/2008, which applies the Basel II 
directive into the Czech law, each bank65 is obliged to identify possible future economic 
development that could have an adverse effect on the credit exposure and should access the 
capability to withstand such changes. Each institution should run stress tests that are 
meaningful, sufficiently conservative, take into account scenarios for at least a mild 
recession and covers the majority part of the portfolio. Within this quite broad definition 
the institution itself can decide about its stress testing procedure and scenarios, while the 
appropriateness must be finally approved by the regulator. 
 The scenarios used in the KB, the UniCredit Bank and the CS are of the same type. 
All these banks responded that they generally use three types of scenarios; those 
developed by the experts in a special department of the bank, those prescribed by the 
Czech National Bank66 and those that were recommended or borrowed from their parent 
banks. While the KB and the UniCredit Bank sent the data on the Czech clients needed for 
stress tests based on a parent company’s scenario to their parent bank, the CS tries to 
apply them on the its data by itself. This fact could give an evidence of a slight difference 
in the complexity of the stress testing models. 
None of these banks had any problem to apply the CNB scenarios and offer the 
proper result of the stress test to the CNB for aggregation. Often the banks were even 
influenced in their expectations and scenario creation, as the UniCredit Bank 
representative mentioned. In the ING in the Czech Republic no stress testing takes place; 
all the data are regularly forwarded to the parent bank and the results of stress tests are 
then sent back to inform about the actual situation67. In the local branch all analysis are 
made just on the level of clients and based on the changes in the risks connected with 
individual transactions.  
In the UniCredit Bank, where the CNB scenarios were accepted as reference 
scenarios, the stress testing is highly dependent on the parent company, to which all data 
                                                 
65
 which is obliged to follow this decree according to the part two § 3-6 
66The stress tests run by the CNB and its cooperation with individual banks will be discussed in the following 
part.  
67
 Because the ING has in the Czech Republic only a branch, the stress tests are run on the global basis by 
parent company, even if it searches for the effect of the scenarios on local players. ING can serve as a good 
comparison for a complexity of stress test methods of the whole international group with those run by local 
banks, but can not be any more included into the survey of the Czech stress testing methods.  
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about clients and scenarios are regularly provided. Parent bank estimates individual 
stressed PDs and in the Czech Republic the stress test is finished. This procedure is 
needed because of the fundamental type of rating system applied for the retail clients, but 
on the other hand it enables according to the UniCredit Bank respondent to pay attention 
to the sensitivity analysis and concentrate more on issues that are often not so properly 
tested. Thanks to cooperation with the parent company the UniCredit Bank can take the 
concentration and the diversification effect within the parts of the portfolio better into 
account and sensitivity analysis for different changes in macroeconomic conditions can be 
run faster and more often. 
6.3.1 Characteristics of stress tests and scenarios 
The complexity of the scenarios used by the Czech banks in the sample differs a 
lot. While the Bank A uses only sensitivity analysis and according to its representative it 
nowadays works on a more advanced models that could be used for running also the 
scenario analysis, in the CS scenario analysis amounts for about 50 % of all scenarios 
covered and in the KB only multi-factor analysis are applied. This statistics perfectly fits 
the general findings by the BIS _CGFS (2005) that larger institutions run mostly 
hypothetical and more advanced tests, while smaller institutions mostly apply sensitivity 
analysis.  
The most complicated is the stress testing process for the UniCredit Bank, where 
because of the type of rating system, the parent bank itself applies all the scenarios on the 
clients´ data and sends back the appropriate parameter values; those can be further used 
for estimation of future losses and some basic sensitivity analysis in the Czech Republic. 
All banks in the sample use only hypothetical scenarios and concluded that they do 
not consider historical scenarios in their stress testing process. The reasons were that the 
banks do not consider them as relevant for the possible future development and that in the 
Czech economy there was no situation that could be used as a historical stress event 
because of past favor development. Only the last years of economic downturn they could 
consider as a stress event situation, so these data are registered and could be used in the 
future as a scenario of historical crisis.   
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In the actual situation the banks see as the most important hypothetical, forward 
looking scenarios that try to forecast future development, while the knowledge of historical 
stress events can influence their experts in expectation and in the scenario creation68. 
One of the surveyed banks, the CS, runs the stress tests also for the mayor decisions 
on the future development of the bank like an introduction of a new product, a change in 
the orientation of the bank or a shift to different distribution channels. In the KB the stress 
tests for such a kind of scenarios are replaced by a less demanding analysis, while in the 
case of the UniCredit Bank all these are done by the headquarters in Italy.  
Macroeconomic variables changes are the factors considered in the scenarios by all 
the banks in the sample. In the KB no other risk factors except of macroeconomic variables 
changes were identified as they consider their portfolio as enough diversified to be 
endangered for example by concentration risk and downturn or downgrade in some 
important industries69. Other banks in the sample reported that they run tests covering 
changes in an external conditions (like an important industry or region downturn), changes 
in portfolio characteristics (like in the transition matrices, concentration in portfolio) and in 
a behavior of clients (willingness to repay, increase in PDs etc.). 
Except for such general scenarios that are often applied to the whole loan 
portfolio70 (considering the difference in the effect of scenario on different products or 
clients groups) a special (sometimes an ad hoc, sometimes repeated) scenario can be 
created for some key products of the portfolio based on the most important risk factors. 
This is for example the case of the CS, which responded to search for an effect of a 
scenario based on the real estate prices decrease on their mortgage portfolio losses in the 
last year71. 
                                                 
68
 The stress tests are nowadays often run also on an ad hoc basis; as reported during the interviews scenarios 
are sometimes created dynamically according to the actual situation and threats expected by experts. 
69
 but on the other hand the KB includes in its stress test the future expected changes in the portfolio structure 
if the scenario materialize, which makes their stress tests more dynamic than if the assumption of no changes 
in the portfolio structure is accepted. 
70
 Most common factors of this type are changes in interest rates, GDP growth, inflation, employment; 
among factors applied on special parts of the loan portfolio can be FX rates, real estate prices and other 
factors that have a significant influence just on some kind of product.  
71
 Similar procedure is applied also in the Bank A, where special scenarios are created just for parts of the 
portfolio or the types of clients on the ad hoc basis, when some suspicion about the future development 
appears. In this bank, as their representative said, the scenario is created each time only for some important 
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The magnitude of the changes in the risk factors is usually based on an expert 
judgment and macroeconomic model used by a specialized department of a bank, however 
it can be in some way influenced by a historical experience and knowledge of past stress 
events the experts have or by the scenarios received from the Czech National Bank.  
Some banks from the sample included into their stress testing program more 
scenarios with the same factors covered that differ only in the severity of the changes in the 
variables. These tests were applied on the whole portfolio in order to see how possible 
future loan book losses depend on the severity of the future development. Finally in all 
such banks it was found that the number of scenarios should rather not be too high and 
many of them were left, keeping mostly just the most and less extreme scenarios. The KB 
credit risk management department tried to run stress tests for even up to 10 scenarios with 
different severity and settings. It soon detected that such a high number of scenarios makes 
the stress testing excessively demanding and the interpretation of results was often 
confusing without bringing much additional information.  
Finally the number of scenarios was reduced to two or three (baseline and most 
sever, sometimes accompanied by some middle scenario) to make the computation and 
presentation of results to management easier and more clear72. In the KB they believe that 
no important information was lost as the results for omitted scenario were between those 
left and find this number of the whole-portfolio scenarios for the periodical tests as 
optimal.  
In the KB and CS a special model is developed for transmission of changes in 
macroeconomic variables into PDs. These are very important part of stress testing program 
as any scenario of future economic development can be by this model easily translated into 
the Basel II parameters to be used in regulatory formulas. The prediction of possible 
change in macroeconomic variables is usually based on some internal macroeconomic 
model, which ensures that such a combination of factor changes is realistic to occur. In 
other banks in the sample the transmission model was not identified.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
part of its portfolio according to the most actual forecast of the development in this product and the relevant 
risk factors; the results are aggregated for the whole portfolio just in case when scenarios are similar.   
72
 Two scenarios were applied also under the CNB joint stress testing program and can be probably seen as 
sufficient number of scenarios applied to the whole portfolio, if they such scenarios that fulfill all the 
characteristics of a good scenario, which are required in Basel II, by CNB or recommended in consultative 
papers.  
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6.3.2 Changes in scenarios, methods and importance of stress testing since the 
beginning of the crisis 
 All the representatives were asked if and how their stress testing processes changed 
before or after the current financial crisis started. In all the banks it was reported that stress 
testing changed considerably. In the Bank A an initiative from the managers to develop 
better stress testing procedure is observed by the credit risk management department; the 
stress tests are run more often and with higher precision73.  
CS started to be applied more variants of the similar scenarios with a different 
severity of risk factor changes since the beginning of the year 2009.Its expert adds that 
thanks to the crisis new factors that could have an adverse effect on their portfolio were 
identified and can be included in the scenarios.  
Furthermore the CS representative noted that before the recession their stress tests 
were mostly based on the changes in the portfolio structure, while later their attention was 
shifted mostly just to the scenarios considering the market variable changes, as they started 
to be more volatile during the crisis in comparison with a quite sTable and positive 
macroeconomic development earlier. In all banks in the sample more severe changes in 
risk factors are incorporated into the scenarios since the crisis started. 
On the other hand the KB representative highlighted that in the Czech Republic the 
Basel II concept came fully into force in 200874 and a preparation of new methods and 
processes was needed by banks to be able to fulfill the new obligations, so a more 
progressive development and motivation from the inside of the banks in the last years can 
according to their opinion partly be a result of a new regulatory requirements introduced. 
Even though also in this bank the experts concluded that in the last year more severe 
scenarios are considered thanks to more volatile market conditions. 
                                                 
73
 This finding is supported also by the trend depicted in the international survey BIS_CGFS (2005) as well 
as in the report about practice in German banks, Stress tests at German banks (2004), where overall increase 
in the number of stress tests (considering all risks) run by banks (however higher in scenario tests than for 
sensitivity analysis) and increase in the number of credit risk stress tests and its sophistication is described. 
74
 According to the Financial Stability Report (2007) some banks introduced the Basel II system already 
since 1.7.2007, but the new rules were generally applied by all banks since January 2008. As mentioned the 
CNB decree 123/2007coll. amended by decree 282/2008 came into force on May 15 2007 and August 15 
2008 respectively and takes effect since 1.7.2007, accepting a possibility that banks can apply this regulation 
since the beginning of 2008. 
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6.3.3 The frequency of stress testing and scenario changes  
The frequency of periodical tests differs among the Czech banks, but in each case 
fits the Basel II limit that asks for at least annual stress tests. In the CS periodical tests are 
repeated each quarter based on a scenario according to the actual prognosis of the future 
development in the macroeconomic variables. More frequent changes are possible in case 
if external conditions are extremely volatile.  
In the KB the frequency is semiannual with other characteristics the same as in the 
CS. The Bank A follows the minimal regulatory frequency and the UniCredit Bank ran the 
periodical tests each nine month or once a year, but during the last year it started to repeat 
the tests with a semiannual frequency and also in the future it wants to keep this trend. 
Moreover in the KB, CS and the Bank A the ad hoc scenarios are run very often; each time 
when they find some relevant scenario for a part of their portfolio. Results of such ad hoc 
tests are usually analyzed immediately and serve as an early warning against a possible 
extreme loss. 
The time needed for one stress test, from defining the scenario till the final report 
with results takes from few weeks in Bank A, where only sensitivity analyses are run, up to 
2 or 3 months in the UniCredit Bank and in the KB respectively. Here we can see the 
trade-off between obtaining the stress test result fast to react to possible adverse future 
development in the economic variables and the encompassment of all important factors and 
portfolio parts75.  
In the KB the scenario test can give much more precise results than if only 
sensitivity analysis is applied like in other banks, but in the case of the UniCredit Bank the 
length of the process is caused by the dependence on the parent company in the setting of 
clients´ parameters values needed for the stress test. 
6.3.4 The reports on stress testing and possible corrective measures 
The stress testing process as a part of an institution’s risk management can be 
according to the Basel II rules in CEBS (2006) delegated by the management body to 
specific risk committees or to the senior management, but the role of management body 
stays crucial for approving the overall institutions´ stress testing framework and design of 
                                                 
75
 In the most cases it can not be generally said that the faster or the less complicated method the better or the 
worse, because the omitted effect on the other factors in the sensitivity analysis can be quite high and the too 
complicated tests can take a long time. The UniCredit Bank could however in the next years increase their 
possibilities in stress testing if at least IRB foundation was introduced for the whole portfolio.  
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scenarios.76 The results of the main stress test must be according to this directive reported 
to the senior management and the management body clearly and with appropriate 
frequency, which should enable them to approve necessary steps to forego large losses.  
The remedial measures applied depend on the circumstances and can include 
according to CEBS (2006, $41, p.12) for example reduction of exposures or business in 
some specific region, sector or portfolio, reviewing capital adequacy, reconsidering the 
funding policy or implementation of contingency plans.    
In the Czech Republic the reports on results are prepared for the management each 
four month in the CS, each quarter in the UniCredit Bank and semiannually in the KB, but 
except for these periodical reports some stress test results can be reported immediately, as 
mentioned for the ad hoc tests that are a common practice in the Bank A. 
In all the surveyed banks the results of the stress tests are used for a risk 
management purposes; the results (if adverse) can lead according to all the interviewed 
representatives to changes in the portfolio structure, bank’s lending policy, underwriting 
criteria, limits on the amount offered to some clients and in better hedging.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76
 The definition of management body can be found under point 40 p.11 of this document. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of answers to questions about stress testing 
Source: by author 
  source of scenarios                     
  
own 
expert
s 
parent 
comp
any CNB risk factors covered 
coverage of 
tests 
sensitivit
y/scenari
o tests 
historical/ 
hypothetical 
magnitude of 
change in risk 
factors and settings 
of correlations 
among them 
changes since the 
beginning of the crisis 
frequenc
y of 
scenario 
changes 
duration 
of 
average 
test 
frequency of 
regular stress 
tests 
frequenc
y of 
reporting 
possible 
corrective 
measures based 
on reports 
CS x x x 
mostly macro and 
market variables´ 
changes, also key 
decision of 
management, new 
products and 
distribution channels. 
depends on 
the stress 
scenario, for 
whole portfolio 
or just parts 
50% to 
50% 
hypothetical 
(because 
we have no 
data on 
severe 
stress 
events 
available 
from 
history) 
according to 
experts´ 
expectations, macro 
models, 
new risk factors 
detected, tests for more 
adverse changes, 
started to test more 
variants of one 
scenario with different 
severity of changes in 
factors, started to test 
market variables´ 
changes, before the 
crisis mainly scenarios 
of changes in portfolio 
quarterly 
or more 
often * quarterly 
at least 
three 
times a 
year + 
reporting 
of ad hoc 
tests 
changes in 
portfolio and 
credit policy, 
limits, hedging 
KB x x x 
mostly only changes in 
macro variables 
mostly the 
whole portfolio 
covered, but 
effects of 
scenario on 
PD and LGD 
for different 
parts of 
portfolio differs  scen. hyp. 
set by colleagues 
from special 
department, based 
on macro model 
increase in importance 
of stress testing in pillar 
II and with 
implementation of 
Basel II, more severe 
changes in risk factors 
semiann
ually 3 months 
once a year, 
this year and 
further ahead 
plans 
semiannually 
and more 
often on 
management 
request  
semiann
ually + 
reporting 
of ad hoc 
tests 
changes in 
portfolio 
structure, 
changes in 
granted amounts, 
changes in 
underwriting 
criteria  
UCB x x x 
mostly changes in PDs, 
initial PDs for expected 
future development 
based on macro model 
are provided by parent 
company 
the whole 
portfolio 
covered 
scen. + 
sens. hyp. 
CNB scenario as a 
reference for 
changes in variables 
no big changes, 
because earlier 
scenarios were very 
conservative, (just input 
parameters are now 
more adverse) 
semiann
ually 2 months 
each nine 
month or once 
a year, the 
year 2009 and 
further ahead 
semiannually quarterly 
shift in business 
strategy, change 
in limits or 
changes in credit 
policy 
Bank A x 
just 
sends 
data  
just 
sends 
data  
macro and market 
variable changes, tests 
for key management 
decisions etc. 
for parts of 
portfolio, if 
needed the 
results are 
aggregated 
sens. 
only 
(intends 
to 
prepare 
a model 
for 
scenario 
tests) hyp. 
according to 
experts´ 
expectations 
increase in importance 
of stress testing and 
motivation from inside 
the bank, increase in 
frequency and 
precision, more severe 
changes in risk factors * 
few 
weeks 
and 
more, 
depends 
on 
complexi
ty 
regular tests 
once a year, 
accompanied 
by ad hoc 
tests 
all tests 
reported 
immediat
ely 
changes in 
underwriting 
criteria, limits and 
plans in case of 
materialization of 
negative events 
ING 
(answers 
provided 
by parent 
company) * * * 
macro, downgrades of 
some clients, 
industries, regions. 
the whole 
portfolio or just 
parts 
according to 
asset classes 
or regions * hyp. 
according to time 
series modeling 
increased focus on 
stress testing, more ad 
hoc test are requested, 
more severe changes 
in risk factors * * 
once a year or 
semiannually + 
ad hoc tests * * 
*no information provided             
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6.4 Concluding remarks to the research questions 
During the survey four Czech banks and one branch were visited to collect 
information about their credit rating systems and loan book credit risk stress testing. The 
questions were the same for all banks in the sample. Based on the facts collected three 
research questions formulated at the beginning of this chapter can be answered.  
All the surveyed banks are in some way influenced by their parent companies. In 
the ING a common rating system is shared, which was developed in assistance of experts 
from more banks in the financial group including Czech employees. But all the banks in 
the sample are influenced in the scenarios they use. As mentioned in the CS some 
scenarios from Vienna can be borrowed or recommended for applying in the local bank for 
stress testing.  
In general it can be concluded that banks with more advanced rating methods that 
are able to run scenario stress tests by themselves (like the CS and the KB) are more 
willing to apply scenarios from parent companies by themselves or at least discuss in 
details the stress testing methods applied on their data, which can improve their own stress 
testing procedure. While in the other two cases, where the UniCredit Bank is highly 
dependent on the parent setting of parameter values for stress testing and in both banks just 
sensitivity analysis can be run, such sharing of experience with their parents was not 
mentioned. 
Most of the banks were in some way influenced by the CNB new project and 
scenarios received, because in the most cases they were considered to be a valuable 
forecast of  a possible future economic development. In the UniCredit Bank these were 
taken as reference scenarios, while in the KB the similarity of the results received from 
their own periodical stress tests proved, according to its representative, appropriateness of 
the scenarios prepared by the KB´s experts. 
The types of scenarios also differ among the surveyed banks. In general larger 
Czech banks with more advanced rating systems run in comparison more scenario analysis, 
which corresponds to the experience from abroad, as showed in BIS_CGFS (2005) and 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2004).  
Further in the Bank A, the CS and the KB, ad hoc or regular tests specialized on 
specific parts of portfolio are undertaken. Although in the Bank A ad hoc tests are 
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according to its representative the only stress tests applied77, in the CS these tests are part 
of stress testing program, which specializes on the most important parts of its portfolio, to 
ensure better credit risk management. In the CS and the KB also analysis based on the key 
decision of management about the future policies are covered. In both of these banks the 
stress tests are run with higher frequency, if we do not consider the new trend in the 
UniCredit Bank to run tests semiannually. 
The time needed for one stress test depends according to this study on types of 
scenarios used by the institution, the coverage of the test and on a type of the rating system 
used, (as it enables the bank to use its own estimated parameters for stress testing). 
Corrective measures that are possible to take based on results of stress testing do not differ 
significantly. 
The answer to the last research question appeared to be more complicated, because 
an experienced more dynamic development in stress testing application and methods that 
could have been motivated by the crisis is probably mixed with the impact of the 
implementation of the new regulatory rules. Basel II was introduced by Czech banks in 
January 2008 (in some cases earlier), so by this time Czech banks needed to improve their 
stress testing procedures to fulfill the CNB decree requirements. It is hard to differentiate 
what caused the observed progress and increase in the importance of stress testing, because 
the effects of both events were mixed.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77
 The representative wanted to cover during the interview only ad hoc tests. He reported that they are the 
only tests applied in the bank A, but he also highlighted that their stress testing program meets the Basel II 
minimum requirements.  
   65 
 
7. Estimation of the capital requirement for an institution’s portfolio 
– a bias that arises from low segmentation 
7.1 Top-down vs. bottom-up approach to stress testing 
According to the Quagliariello (2009), there are two main approaches to stress tests 
for the whole financial systems. The top-down approach uses data on the institution level, 
not seeing the segmentation to rating classes. Under this approach a uniform model is 
applied to transfer the scenario on the institution’s figures. On the other hand, the bottom-
up approach works with data on each contract and obligor. The tests are usually run by the 
financial institutions themselves, while each institution can use different internal models to 
link the shift in risk factors to PDs. The scenarios are in both cases determined by the 
supervisory body, which afterwards collects and aggregates the results to judge an overall 
impact on the financial stability and on individual institutions. 
Based on these definitions it can be deduced that bottom-up approach can give 
more accurate results of estimated capital requirement, because the data used are more 
segmented and detailed and the portfolio loss is estimated according to each client’s 
sensitivity to the scenario. In the bottom-up stress tests institutions use all the data 
available on clients and scenarios as inputs into internal models calibrated according to 
their historical experience.  
On the other hand, because of the difference in settings of the models and 
assumptions used, the results from these tests are usually hard to aggregate or compare 
among institution. The complexity of scenario that can be applied in these stress tests 
highly depend on the models developed and rating methods used by the institutions. 
According to Čihák (2007), a big advantage of the bottom-up method is that it can 
easily capture concentration in the portfolios, which can be overlooked under the top-down 
approach. But once the supervisory body decides to conduct a stress test for the whole 
financial system using a bottom-up approach, it will face problems to use more complex 
scenarios, coordinate the process and aggregate the results. 
In fact, the supervisory bodies usually try to combine these methods to get 
advantages of both. For example Austrian stress testing program called Systemic Risk 
Monitor (SRM)78 according to Boss et al. (2009) starts with the analysis of scenario impact 
                                                 
78
 Like most of the macro stress testing programs, the SRM covers more risk types. It is a model that can 
capture credit as well as market risk as two most important risks of a bank. 
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on individual institutions` portfolios on the level of contracts and obligors, which is further 
enlarged by an inter-bank model that can capture contagion effect. According to Laviola et. 
al (2009) the stress tests run under the FSAP program in Italy were also of two kinds. The 
supervisory body ran the top-down macro stress tests based on the flow of new bad debts79. 
The bottom–up stress tests were conducted by the institutions themselves according to the 
macroeconomic scenarios provided by the national bank. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank uses the above mentioned bottom-up approach as well 
as a top-down stress testing. The latter contains two main parts, as in Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2007). At first, within the macro module, a scenario is prepared using a 
system of econometric linkages and models for macroeconomic variables and macro stress 
tests are run. The results are further used in a bank module, where institutions that can get 
in problems under given scenario are identified. 
7.2 Stress testing in the Czech National Bank80 
Stress tests for the whole Czech banking sector are one of the measures used by the 
Czech National Bank to monitor the financial stability. In fact there are two types of 
programs in the CNB that use stress tests. Firstly the top-down stress tests, which results 
are each year published in the Financial Stability Reports. The second type of stress tests is 
bottom-up, which is based on the information collected from banks. All the banks included 
in the sample for the survey described in chapter 6 (of course except for ING) reported that 
they took part in this program. 
Within this new project (also called “joint” stress testing), which was introduced in 
September 2009, Czech banks81 were provided with two scenarios, a baseline and an 
adverse scenario, defined in terms of future development of macroeconomic variables as 
well as in a percentage change in PDs for each stressed segment of the portfolio. Relevant 
parameters for these two scenarios were estimated by each bank, using their own models. 
                                                 
79
 Such a type of data is a commonly used PD proxy, because of its availability in national credit registers. 
80
 General information about the joint stress testing project was received during the interview in the banks as 
well as a consultation in the CNB.  
81
 Up till now not all Czech banks were asked to take part in this project, because of different levels of stress 
testing methods developed in the banks. For the purpose of project the IRB foundation or at least capability 
to use this method (considering institutions that already applied to use this approach) was necessary for this 
stress test.  
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Finally the results for capital requirement and other important measures under these 
scenarios were sent back for aggregation.  
Only some of the banks reported during the survey that they are able to link a 
macroeconomic scenario to the PDs, so they could probably estimate their own PDs 
relevant for the CNB’s scenarios. The rest of the banks that took part in the joint stress 
testing program probably used the percentage change in PDs estimated by the CNB for an 
average portfolio. 
For the top-down approach the CNB publishes each year one baseline and two 
alternative scenarios describing possible future economic development82. The results are 
interpreted in the following two ways; how much the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) would 
decrease and how much money would need to be invested into the financial sector to keep 
all institutions above the CAR required level.  
7.3 Comparison of capital requirements estimated under models for different level of 
segmentation 
In this section I will introduce a unique model for a comparison of the capital 
requirement that is estimated under different levels of portfolio segmentation. Because 
under the top-down approach the micro data, that would enable the regulator to estimate 
for example the models of PDs for each rating class of an institution, are not available, the 
estimates can turn out to be less accurate. On the other hand the bottom-up stress testing 
models use data with higher segmentation, which should lead to more precise results. 
Most of the empirical papers that contain models of stress testing, use aggregated 
data for the whole banking sector and try to find significant explanatory variables for some 
PD proxy or compare them among more countries. In this chapter I will compare results of 
stress tests under a model with segmentation of the portfolio according to the credit quality 
to the ones without segmentation. Basically, I will try to find out, whether a segmentation 
of the data on portfolio can lead to a significantly different estimated capital requirement 
                                                 
82
 For the year 2008 CNB prepared three scenarios–safe heaven, property market crisis and loss of 
confidence. The real economy finally followed the safe heaven scenario for more than half a year and than 
shifted toward the property market crisis. For the year 2009 three different scenarios of Europe in recession, 
market nervousness and economic depression were prepared (see Financial stability report 2008/2009, CNB 
for more details about macroeconomic variable setting for each scenario) out of which the market 
nervousness would according to the CNB results hit the most banks, but would not endanger the stability of 
the financial market under the assumption of one year duration of the shock.  
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for the same stress scenario. The estimates of the capital requirement under the tests run by 
the institution are usually based on data of each client or contract and i.e. should be the 
most accurate. On the other hand, if we use as inputs into the stress test the average data 
(without any segmentation) that characterize the whole portfolio, the estimates can be 
biased, which can lead to an inaccurate conclusion about the institutions` stability. The 
model developed further will show, if there is some significant difference in estimates due 
to segmentation. 
The inputs into the model are real data on PDs provided for purpose of this thesis 
by one Czech bank. Three sets of historical time series with different level of segmentation 
were used. The most general data is the time series of PDs for the whole corporate 
segment. Further data on PDs for its investment (including rating classes 1 to 683) and sub-
investment part (including lower quality classes 7 to 13) were available. The data for 
model with the highest segmentation are represented by a set of series on PDs for each 
rating class. All data are available quarterly since June 2005 till December 2009; for the 
next year a stress scenario will be implemented. On the Figure 7.1 the logic of the model is 
depicted. 
Figure 7.1: Model for the estimation of a capital requirement under different levels 
of input data segmentation 
 
Source: by author 
                                                 
83
 The financial institution differentiates its corporate clients into 14 rating classes according to their credit 
quality; the lower the number of the classes, the higher the quality of the client. The rating class 14 contains 
only clients in default.  
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7.3.1 Description of the regression model 
At first a regression model is needed to link the PDs on different levels of 
segmentation to the key economic variables. Because the data on PDs are between or equal 
to 0 and 1 the logistic regression model would be most suiTable84. However it is also 
possible to use an equivalent method, where a linear regression is applied on a logistic 
transformation of the PDs85.  
The most common explanatory variables that determine corporate default rates 
according to Jukivuolle, Virolainen, Vähämaa (2008) and Jakubík, Schmieder (2008) are 
measures of indebtness of corporate sector, interest rates, GDP and in the latter as well 
unemployment rate, exchange rates, inflation and GDP of the main trading partners. I 
covered all of these categories and found as significant the following four variables.  
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 86 
variable 
description abbreviation mean median 
standard 
deviation C.V. skewness  ex.kurtosis 
real interest rate 
3M Real 3M -0,0019 0,00078 0,012 6,458 -0,83 -0,016 
ratio of value of 
loans to 
corporate sector 
to GDP Loans/GDP 0,8037 0,81042 0,086 0,107 -0,09 -1,133 
price of industrial 
products Ind. prices 102,33 102,85 2,76 0,027 -0,655 -0,353 
exchange rate – 
EUR/CZK EUR/CZK 0,0369 0,03672 0,002 0,061 0,414 -0,761 
Source: by author 
 
 The regression equation for the model of PDs for the whole corporate segment as 
dependent on the explanatory variables can be expressed as follows: 
                                                 
84
 For model for individual PDs with similar structure see the section 5.1. 
85
 The logistic transformation changes the domain of definition to all real numbers, so the transformed PDs 
can directly enter a linear regression model as dependent variable. 
86
 The source of the first three variables is a statistic database of the CNB (ARAD), the last variable is from 
www.oanda.com. Real interest rates were derived based on the Fisher equation from inflation rate and 
nominal PRIBOR 3M (three month Prague Interbank Offer Rate). The ratio of loans to GDP was calculated 
as a total value of loans to corporate sector in local and foreign currencies provided by Czech banks to the 
absolute GDP in current prices. The exchange rate EUR/CZK is defined as amount of EUR one can get for 
one Czech koruna. Index of industrial prices is expressed as annual moving average in constant prices of 
2005.  
   70 
 
ttttt
t
t CZKEURpricesindGDPloansMreal
PD
PD
εβββββ +++++=





−
−− 4434210 /*_*/*3_*1
ln
 
  The model for more segmented data describing the PDs of investment and sub-
investment parts of the portfolio was estimated using two separate equations of the same 
structure as above. The PDs for each rating class were considered as a panel data. The 
estimated regression parameters and their significance is shown in the following Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3: Regression parameters for models with different level of input data 
segmentation and their significance 
Coeff. β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
adjusted 
R-squared 
unadjusted  
R-squared 
variab. Const. Real 3M Loans/GDP Ind.prices EUR/CZK     
model for PD-for the whole 
corporate sector 
      
  -18,6073 25,4027 6,93398 0,137738 -117,729 0,80825 0,85938 
  (6,86E-05)*** (0,0012)*** (6,98E-05)*** (0,0011)*** (0,0131)**    
          
model for investment part of portfolio 
     
  -8,34907 16,6605 6,58874  -  -60,4344 0,94853 0,95883 
  (9,08E-09)*** 
(3,72E-
05)*** (1,11E-07)***  (0,0247)**    
          
model for PDs for sub-investment part of portfolio 
    
  -17,8624 24,8311 6,48495 0,133622 -110,326 0,7989 0,85253 
   (7,30E-05)*** 
 (0,0011) 
*** (9,31E-05)*** (0,0011)***  (0,0154)**     
Source: by author, values in brackets are p-values of the estimated parameters; ** means that the estimate is 
significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 
Because of a logistic transformation of the PDs, it is not possible to interpret the 
coefficients as elasticities. Although, because the natural logarithm (ln x) is an increasing 
function of its argument (x), we can still comment the signs of the estimated coefficients 
and conclude if the variable influences the PDs in a positive or negative way. 
For the results above, an interpretation of the coefficient’s signs is quite intuitive. 
An increase in a real three month interest rate will cause an increase in a probability of 
default as a rate on a corporate debt increases and the financial resources of the firms 
become more expensive; it will be more difficult to meet their obligation from credits. The 
higher is the ratio of loans to firms to GDP and the higher the prices of industrial products 
the more corporate client will stop to repay their debts. In the first case the corporate sector 
will become too indebted relatively to the GDP and many firms will not have enough 
financial resources from production to repay the credits. In the latter the expenses on inputs 
and production in most the firms will increase. 
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The last significant coefficient for exchange rate is negative, which is exactly 
opposite to the empirical findings of CNB (2006) that an appreciation leads to a decrease 
in profitability measured as return on equity87. For this particular portfolio, the effect is 
exactly opposite. This may be a case, when most of the clients use as inputs imported 
materials and resources that become more expensive when Czech koruna depreciates. This 
will increase their production costs as well as their probability of default.  
The coefficient of determination is sufficiently high in all regression models; in all 
cases the explanatory variables can explain at least 80% of movements of the dependent 
variable. All the assumptions for the OLS method were checked88. According to the 
collinearity test using variance inflation factors, there is no multicolinearity present among 
the data series. The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity in the White test can not be 
refused for none of the models. The Durbin-Watson statistics is sufficiently close to 2 in 
both models for aggregated data and sub-investment PDs, so we can not refuse that there is 
no autocorrelation in disturbances. For the model for investment part of portfolio a more 
general Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation (tested for autocorrelation up to order 4) 
as well as Ljung-Box test was further checked and both these tests showed that their 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation in disturbances can not be refused. The normality test did 
not refuse that the distribution of residual is normal. 
Similar model was applied on the data series on PDs for each rating class. For an 
estimation of panel data regression by OLS method the errors terms must be uncorrelated 
with each other and have equal variance. The Breusch-Pagan test showed that the variance 
covariance matrix of residuals is not diagonal and error terms are correlated. For this 
reason a weighted least square method was used instead of OLS. The estimated of 
coefficients are listed on the following Table 7.4 and results of tests for assumptions 
needed for weighted least square method can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87
 The Czech Republic is one of export-oriented countries, so the stronger is the appreciation of Czech koruna 
the higher will be prices of the goods of Czech exporters on the foreign markets and the more difficult it will 
be to sell the products (this may lead to higher probability of default).   
88   Results of all tests, their test statistics and p-values can be found in appendix 2. 
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Table 7.4: Coefficients and their significance in model for segmented data on 
corporate loans 
variable constant real 3M Loans/GDP (t-4) ind_prices EUR/CZK (t-4) 
coefficient β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 
corp1 28,6747  -   -  -0,43015  -  
  0,0004***     6,35E-06***   
corp2 40,2686 -115,104  - -0,544601  - 
  0,0248** 0,0026***   0,0040***   
corp3 37,2372  -  - -0,582748 305,983 
   0,0060***     3,55E-05*** 0,0175** 
corp4 33,7924  -   -  -0,606517 484,022 
  1,77E-05***     2,89E-09*** 3,21E-07*** 
corp5 -0,148912 41,5501 9,61276 -0,158023  - 
  0,9804 0,0009*** 6,18E-06*** 0,0118**   
corp6 -0,215094 25,0003 9,34077 -0,146874  - 
  0,9396 0,0001*** 2,10E-09*** 7,35E-05***   
corp7 -8,93056 27,8108 10,5724 -0,0619968  - 
  0,0053*** 2,59E-05*** 2,63E-010*** 0,0220**   
corp8 -10,815 26,2588 6,67183 -  - 
  8,84E-010*** 0,0004*** 3,63E-06***     
corp9 -21,7964 39,8532 10,7348 0,130025 -126,02 
  6,59E-05*** 0,0001*** 5,18E-06*** 0,0046*** 0,0202** 
copr10 -19,095 14,7936 8,13092 0,0877137  - 
  6,43E-06*** 0,0033*** 3,30E-09*** 0,0022***   
corp11 -20,9685 25,0528 2,24667 0,160223  - 
  8,92E-05*** 0,0011*** 0,0131** 0,0004***   
corp12 -25,2162 26,6036 3,88669 0,234942 -91,7544 
  5,34E-06*** 0,0010***  0,0062*** 1,56E-05*** 0,0463** 
corp13 -12,2683 18,3239 3,3206 0,13199 -115,234 
  0,0049*** 0,0212** 0,0275** 0,0041*** 0,0303** 
Source: by author, values under the estimated values for the coefficients are p-values; ** means that the 
estimate is significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
 
The Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality confirms that residuals in this 
system are normally distributed. Further there was no ARCH effect found in first four lags 
and according to Ljung-Box test in most of the equations none of the autocorrelation 
coefficients up to lag 4 is significant. 
7.3.2 Stress scenarios used 
As already mentioned, the Czech National Bank offers regularly scenarios that are 
used for stress testing the financial sector. Each year there is a baseline scenario that 
represents an expected development in economic variables and two or more alternative 
scenarios that are more adverse. Based on an estimation of an impact of these adverse 
scenarios on baking sector’s key variables, the resistance of the banking sector and its 
stability is assessed. 
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For purpose of this model I will use the most actual scenarios from CNB (2010), 
which predicts scenarios for next two years (2010 and 2011). The predictions on each 
individual factor in these scenarios are based on an internal macroeconomic model of 
CNB, which takes into account correlations among factors and ensures economic 
consistency of the scenario. The two adverse scenarios used are depicted on the Figure 7.5 
as Double dip and Loss of confidence. 
 
Figure 7.5: Scenarios by CNB used for stress testing 
 
Source: CNB (2010) 
 
Double dip scenario describes, according to CNB (2010), a recession characterized 
by GDP decrease of more than 4 % at the end of 2010. The exchange rate will appreciate 
to less than 24 CZK per EUR and interest rates as well as inflation will stay on low levels. 
On the other hand, Loss of confidence is a more adverse scenario that could materialize in 
a case, if a risk aversion to Czech Republic will increase due to increasing public deficits. 
The exchange rate will depreciate to nearly 28,5 CZK per EUR in the first quarter, which 
will lead to an increase in inflation (reaching nearly 4 % at the and of the year) and in 
Real GDP growth in % 
 Nominal 3M PRIBOR in % 
 
Inflation in % Exchange rate 
Loss of confidence Loss of confidence 
Loss of confidence Loss of confidence 
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interest rates. The nominal 3M PRIBOR will raise to 6% in the third quarter and the real 
GDP growth will reach the bottom at the end of the year at less than -1,5 %. 
 Considering the significant variables that were found as crucial for development of 
probabilities of default of this portfolio, the three month real interest rate can be derived 
from CNB forecasts based on Fisher equation. Because the ratio of corporate loans to GDP 
and exchange rate enter the regression with one year lag, it is not needed to forecast them 
to estimate the PDs during 2010. The only significant variable that is left to be forecasted 
is the index for a price of industrial products. This was predicted based on a side regression 
model that could sufficiently explain development of this variable as dependent on the 
exchange rate with a lag of 2 quarters and real GDP growth with a lag of 4 quarters, both 
of which are forecasted by the CNB. The dependence can be expressed as follows (more 
details on tests for assumptions needed for OLS are available in Appendix 2): 
 
42 __*8726,89/*667,7207351,70_ −− ++= tt growthGDPrealCZKEURpricesind
  (2,26E-7)***      (0,0019)***   (8,55E-6)***   
 Adjusted R-squared=76,31% 
     
 Once having all significant explanatory variables forecasted for the above defined 
scenarios, the stressed PDs for 2010 can be derived based on the inversion of the initial 
logistic transformation. 
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7.3.3 Capital requirement computation 
Assuming that the portfolio structure meets all the requirements for using the Basel 
II formulas, the minimum capital requirement can be computed based on the formulas 
below. Because the data on LGD are not available, I will accept an assumption that the 
portfolio is homogeneous in LGD, which will not be stressed but set equal for all classes 
and levels of aggregation to 45 %89. This level should be assigned according to BCBS 
                                                 
89
 As a possible improvement of this model, the LGD (or RR) could be made dependent on systemic 
variables and stressed as explained in the section 5.2. 
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(2006, Article 281) and Czech regulation (decree 123/2007 and 282/2008) to senior claims 
on corporates not secured by a collateral. For correlation no adjustment according to firm 
size is used as I deal with data for rating classes (or even less segmented) and have no 
information on individual clients. The exposure (E) is assumed to be equal to a book value 
of a loan90. Maturity (M) is set to 2,5, which is according to Czech decree 123/2007 and 
282/2008 a relevant value for corporate loans for an institution that does not want to 
estimate maturity on its own.  
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where N denotes cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution and G 
denotes the inverse cumulative function to this distribution. 
 
Risk weighted exposition(RWE)= E · r    (where r=0 if  PD = 100 %) 
 
Capital requirement for credit portfolio= 0,08*ΣRWE  
 
7.3.4 Estimated capital requirement under different levels of aggregation of input 
data91 
The capital requirement in percent of exposition is a concave function of PD as 
depicted on the Figure 7.6 
 
 
                                                 
90
 When the capital requirement (CR) is expressed in absolute numbers, the total portfolio exposure (E) is 
considered to be 200 billion Czech Koruna. Because the data were provided by one of big-size banks, I 
consider the exposure of around 25 % of total corporate loans (according to CNB statistic in ARAD) as 
adequate. In most cases the CR will be expressed as percentage of E. 
91
 Further I will comment only results for Loss of Confidence scenario, which turned out to be more adverse 
and mostly compare the value of variables at first quarter of 2010, when the scenario seems to hit the 
portfolio considerably. Further the portfolio PDs return to values close to values during 2009. So the capital 
requirement estimated should reach the peak in the first quarter of 2010. The whole analysis is made under 
the assumption that the portfolio structure does not change in time.  
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Figure 7.6: Capital requirement as percentage of exposition for different levels of 
PD 
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Source: by author 
 
Based on the results from regression models it is obvious that lower PD rating 
classes (loans with higher credit quality) are more sensitive to the stress applied on the 
portfolio. While the PD in the model for non-segmented data increased between the fourth 
quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010 by 70 %, all PDs for rating classes 1 to 9 
increased by a significantly higher percentage. The same result was found for an 
investment and sub-investment parts of portfolio, which increased by 75 % and 65,5 % 
respectively (some of PDs values and changes are listed in the Table 7.7). This would lead 
to a general conclusion that low quality expositions are less risk sensitive than a high 
quality ones.  
 
Table 7.7: Shift in PDs for different level of segmentation under stress scenario 
forecasted PD real PD absolute change relative change 
  (1Q 2010 ) (4Q 2009) (1Q2010 to 4Q2009) (1Q2010 to 4Q2009) 
Portfolio – no 
segmentation 7,20% 4,23% 2,98% 70,50% 
inv. 2,07% 1,18% 0,89% 75,23% 
spec. 8,53% 5,19% 3,34% 64,42% 
corp1 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 261,71% 
corp3 0,10% 0,04% 0,06% 146,81% 
corp4 0,24% 0,14% 0,10% 73,14% 
corp5 0,73% 0,18% 0,55% 306,04% 
corp6 0,97% 0,34% 0,63% 186,37% 
corp9 5,89% 2,39% 3,50% 146,32% 
corp10 7,02% 4,60% 2,42% 52,56% 
corp11 5,29% 4,53% 0,76% 16,76% 
corp13 42,32% 35,10% 7,22% 20,58% 
Source: by author 
 
The weights of rating classes in the portfolio could not be estimated from 
information received from the bank. Because the PDs describe only the probability of 
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direct default for given rating class, it is not possible to estimate relevant weights by 
weighting the PDs. As the correct weights to sum the results of capital requirements for 
segmented data are missing and can not be estimated, it turned out to be impossible to 
estimate an absolute bias that can arise from an omission of segmentation.  
But based on the statistics of CNB about a total distribution of credits between 
standard and classified loans and a rule of thumb how a typical banks portfolio 
composition can look like, we can assume that classes belonging to the investment part of 
the portfolio have higher weights than the sub-investment classes. Under this assumption it 
can be concluded that, because of the higher sensitivity of low PD classes and their 
relatively higher weight in the portfolio, the capital requirement computed in the model 
with no segmentation will be lower than the one based on the data on each rating class. 
Because of no segmentation the capital requirement needed under the stress scenario will 
be underestimated.  
Further, I have decided to broaden the analysis by applying the percentage shift 
estimated for the non-segmented data on the rating classes` PDs. The same was done by 
some banks within the joint stress tests. Those banks that have not yet developed the model 
to link PDs to economic variables used average percentage change offered by the CNB as 
the one consistent with the scenarios for changing their rating classes PDs. These banks 
took initial PDs increased by this average shift and computed in this way the level of 
capital requirement under stress, which was sent to the CNB. 
For this analysis I needed to estimate weights that will be used for computation of 
the exposition in each rating class. The same weights were used in both models, in the one 
where PDs for classes are based on regression model and in the second where stressed PDs 
are set equal to the pre-stress values increased by an average shift of 70 percent estimated 
for whole portfolio. Even though the average shift was computed based on data on 
aggregated portfolio, using the same weights for aggregation in both models should help to 
get comparable results. 
 The final weights were based on the CNB statistics on a structure of a Czech 
portfolio and on an expert judgment how the portfolio of the bank that provided the data 
can look like. Furthermore I add other two portfolios, one more risky that can be typical for 
a bank in developing country in crisis, as the weights for lower rating classes are higher, 
and other that is less risky for a bank that have higher exposure in higher quality credits. 
The structure is described on Figure 7.8.    
 
   78 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Assumed structures of a portfolio for capital requirement estimation 
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Source: by author – the portfolio called Czech Rep. is based on the ARAD statistics describing the 
percentage of credits for 5 rating categories and adjusted according to expectation on the structure of 
portfolio of this particular bank.  
 
On the Figure 7.9 the capital requirements for the two models are compared. The 
estimated capital is: 
1. based on the stressed PDs for each rating class/sub-segment as they were 
forecasted by the regression analysis and relevant estimated coefficients 
(further denoted as model A) 
2. based on PDs equal to their initial real values at the end of 2009 increased 
by the average shift of 70 %. (Model B) 
 
Figure 7.9: Estimated capital requirement for PDs stressed according to a 
regression analysis and PDs increased by an average shift  
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Source: by author 
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As obvious from the picture, if the bank would use the average change in PDs it 
would underestimate its capital requirement under stress scenario under the assumption 
made on the weights in the portfolio. The bias is the higher, the more detailed data on the 
portfolio are used and the less risky the portfolio is. For the model, which is based on the 
data on rating classes, the properly stressed PDs leads to about 25 % higher estimated 
capital requirement relatively to the model with a percentage shift in PDs. In the model of 
investment and sub-investment parts of portfolio the estimate under the first is about 6,5 % 
higher relatively to the latter model. Precise values are summed in the Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Estimated capital requirements for PDs stressed according to a 
regression analysis (model A) and PDs increased by an average shift (model B) 
estimated capital requirement absolute CR CR 
investment versus sub-investment 
weights 
used (1Q 2010) (as % of E) 
relative 
difference 
Model A more risky 23 515 943,42 11,76% 5,96% 
  ČR 23 321 523,36 11,66% 6,51% 
  less risky 22 898 221,61 11,45% 7,71% 
Model B  more risky 22 193 676,21 11,10%   
  ČR 21 895 242,06 10,95%   
  less risky 21 258 303,96 10,63%   
estimated capital requirement absolute CR CR 
for rating classes 
weights 
used (1Q 2010) (as % of E) 
relative 
difference 
Model A more risky 15 697 386,38 7,85% 24,48% 
  ČR 14 905 811,72 7,45% 25,90% 
  less risky 13 225 983,62 6,61% 28,99% 
Model B more risky 12 610 485,05 6,31%   
  ČR 11 839 598,72 5,92%   
  less risky 10 253 634,89 5,13%   
Source: by author 
  
Within this chapter I at first proofed that the segmentation according to the credit 
quality can result in a more precise estimation of the capital requirement. It was shown that 
the low PD classes (containing high quality credits) are relatively more sensitive to the 
stress scenario. Under an assumption that the portfolio has the most common structure, the 
capital requirement estimated based on the non-segmented data will be lower that the more 
precise estimate considering different clients` credit quality.   
Further, it was highlighted that when the banks use a percentage shift for stressing 
their PDs based on the estimate from the model for non-segmented data, instead of 
applying their own model that links PDs of each segment to the shifts in economic 
variables in the scenario, the capital requirement estimate will be biased. 
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 It can be concluded that the segmentation according to the credit quality is 
an important parameter that should be taken into account during the stress tests to get more 
precise estimates of capital requirement and to better judge the financial stability of an 
institution. The implementation of segmentation into the stress tests for the whole financial 
sector is easier under the bottom-up approach. Based on the second part of this chapter, the 
banks however need to have in place well developed methods to stress test their portfolio 
based on their own internal models. The PDs for different parts of portfolio should be 
linked to the development of economic variables under the scenario to get precise estimate 
of capital requirement.   
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8. Conclusion 
Stress testing in general, considering any type of risk, is defined as a term for 
describing the various techniques (quantitative or qualitative) used by institutions to gauge 
their vulnerability to exceptional but plausible events. It is an in-depth analysis of a 
potential impact of a critical event on the institution’s portfolio, financial prosperity and 
capital needed to withstand such a negative development. Although the credit risk is the 
most important risk run by the bank, according to many international studies a 
methodology for its measurement and stress testing is significantly less developed than for 
other risks. This can be an effect of lower availability of data and special characteristics of 
the loss distribution for typical credit products.  
A more dynamic development of credit risk measurement and stress testing came 
with the implementation of the new Basel II regulatory framework, which is more sensitive 
in capital requirement estimation and asks for regular stress testing. This regulation impose 
many quantitative and qualitative requirements on institution’s internal processes and 
models that must be fulfilled, if the institution wants to apply for an implementation of 
more advanced methods, which lead to a lower capital requirement estimated.  
The stress testing is required under both the first and the second pillar to test 
whether the minimum capital requirement increased by the additional buffer would be 
sufficient in adverse conditions. In this sense the stress testing is considered to be a 
complement to the classical credit risk models that assume estimate the maximum loss that 
will materialize with some probability over given time period. The stress testing forecast 
loss under extreme market conditions, which are not covered under the VaR. There already 
exist theoretical approaches such as extreme value theory that tries to incorporate these two 
frameworks into one model, in the reality these two methods stay separated.  
Within the stress testing program the institution is obliged to at first identify all 
significant risk factors, build a scenario based on the shifts in these factors, which can be 
either a sensitivity analysis or a scenario stress test. The former consider movement in only 
one risk factor, is easier to be performed, but omit the effect of comovement in other risk 
factors. Under the latter in the hypothetical scenarios the correlations among factors are 
usually set according to some macroeconomic model or in historical scenarios according to 
some past crisis to ensure its plausibility. Under scenario analysis the loss distribution 
under stress can be estimated more precisely.  
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 The shift in risk factors is further translated to the shift in the input parameters of 
the credit risk model. In this way the stress testing is closely connected to the credit risk 
model used for capital measurement. Under the first pillar the shifts in risk factors are 
linked to the shifts in Basel II parameters, but under the second pillar the assumptions on 
the input variables` settings are relaxed, modified or linked to some explanatory variables. 
The most common scenarios consider changes in economic and other external 
variables, in a behavior of clients or assumptions of the model. The PDs can be for 
example linked to systematic economic variables through regression model, keeping the 
dependence of asset correlation on PDs or not. In few papers also the LGD is linked to risk 
factors as there is evidence that the recovery rates also fluctuates with economic cycle, 
then it will be logically possible that the PDs and LGDs are correlated if they depend on 
the development of the same economic variables.  
Further the portfolio can be tested for a concentration risk applying the scenario of 
an increase in exposure to one sector, region or industry which will be downgraded. The 
migration matrices can be changed for stress testing in two ways, either they can be made 
conditional on the economic recession and expansion or their elements can be directly 
linked to explanatory variables and whole matrix can be estimated based on the forecasted 
economic development.  
Once the scenario is translated into changes in the credit risk model input 
parameters the conditional loss on given scenario can be estimated. The whole process of 
stress testing ends with an analysis of results on the loss distribution and in case an 
implementation of corrective measures to forego materialization of such loss. 
During the survey of the stress testing practice in the Czech Republic, it was found 
that the sophistication of stress tests vary considerably. Bigger banks in the sample mostly 
use hypothetical scenario stress tests, while smaller ones usually run sensitivity analysis, 
which corresponds to the findings of an international survey by BIS. The bigger banks also 
run the periodical tests with higher frequency even though the scenarios are more 
complicated. The time needed for one test depend on the sophistication of the scenario, the 
rating method used and the coverage of the test.  
The stress test methodology seems to differ according to the type of rating method 
used. Just two banks in the sample that use more advanced methods responded that they 
use a model that can link the risk parameters to economic cycle. The banks with more 
advanced methods are also more willing to run stress tests for scenarios prescribed by 
parent banks by themselves or at least discuss the results and methods applied on the 
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Czech data in details. The banks with less advanced rating methods (the Foundation or 
Standardised) more often send data for these stress tests to the parent company. Most of the 
banks were in some way influenced by the CNB stress testing program, because the 
received scenarios were often considered to be a trustful forecast of possible future 
development. 
In all the banks the stress testing methods developed considerably during the last 
years, but this dynamics can be not just an effect of the crisis but also of the 
implementation of the Basel II regulation. Because in the Czech Republic the Basel II 
became fully into force at the beginning of 2008 the changes observed in the institutions` 
stress testing programs can be result of both of these. 
Comparing the stress tests run for different levels of portfolio segmentation, I 
proofed that the bottom-up approach stress tests, if precisely applied by the financial 
institutions, play a key role in stress testing the financial system.  
Based on the real data on corporate segment with different levels of segmentation I 
at first found significant explanatory variables and then forecasted the PDs for the most 
actual stress scenarios offered by the CNB. I analyzed the sensitivity of PDs for different 
levels of segmentation and - assuming a portfolio structure similar to the CNB statistics - I 
concluded that omission of segmentation can lead to an underestimation of the capital 
requirement needed under stress. 
The CNB offered to the banks an average increase of PDs, which was consistent 
with the scenarios used for joint stress testing project. This average increase was probably 
used for computation of capital requirement within this project by the banks that can not 
link the PDs to macroeconomic variables yet.  
Based on this information, I decided to estimate the total minimum capital 
requirement for the portfolio based on the stressed PDs forecasted by the regression model 
and compare it to the same measure using as PDs under stress the values at the end of 2009 
increased by an average change from the model for non-segmented data. To get 
comparable results, in both cases I assumed the same portfolio weights that were set very 
close to the CNB statistics.  
In this case I found that application of an average shift in PDs lead to a lower 
estimate of capital requirement than for the PDs precisely forecasted according to the 
regression models for each rating class. The bias seems to be the higher the less aggregated 
the data on the portfolio are used and the less risky the portfolio is.     
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List of abbreviations 
BCBS Bank Committee on Banking Supervision 
BSM Black-Scholes-Merton 
CaR (CVaR) Credit (Value) at Risk 
CAR Capital adequacy ratio 
CNB Czech National Bank 
CR Capital requirement 
DM Default mode 
E Exposure 
EAD Exposure at default 
EC European Commission 
EDF expected default frequency 
EL Expected loss 
EU European Union 
EVT Extreme Value Theory 
FSAP Financial Stability Assessment Program 
FXrates Foreign exchange rates 
GDP Gross domestic product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRB approach Internal rating based approach 
LGD Loss given default 
M Effective maturity 
MTM Mark-to-market 
OLS Ordinary least square 
PD Probability of default 
PRIBOR Prague Interbank Offer Rate 
RR Recovery rate 
S&P Standard&Poor`s 
SRM Systemic Risk Monitor 
UL Unexpected loss 
VaR Value at Risk 
WB World Bank 
WLS Weighted least square 
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Appendix 1: Questions to the survey on loan book credit risk 
measurement and stress testing in Czech banks 
Questions considering an area of credit risk quantification: 
 
1) How would you characterize your portfolio exposed to credit risk? (your loan 
book, trading book) Do you specialize on some specific clients/product etc.?  
 
2) What kind of rating method do you use? (Quantitative/qualitative, what do you 
consider and how do you estimate rating of a client) Do you use Standardised, 
IRB foundation or IRB advanced method? Which risk parameters do you estimate 
by internal models?  
 
3) Could you describe the link between credit ratings and risk parameters (LGD, 
PD, CF)? How long time series do you use for calibration of the parameter values 
and are they backtested? (How and how often?)  
 
4) How are these parameters further used for minimum required capital estimation, 
economic capital estimation etc.? 
 
5) What kind of model do you use for economic capital estimation?   
 
Questions to credit risk stress testing: 
 
1. What kind of scenarios do you use for stress testing credit risk and why?  
Are some of them prescribed by regulator, by parent company or are they based 
on your own analysis only? 
 
2. Which risk factors do you consider important for your portfolio or its segments?  
Are your stress tests based on  
• economic variables changes (macro changes, industry/region downturn, 
changes in industry volatility) 
• changes in risk parameters (PD, LGD) 
• changes in portfolio (holding period, changes in correlations, transition 
matrices) 
 
3. Do you stress test whole loan book or do you prefer to apply stress tests on 
separate parts of portfolio?  
 
4. How many scenarios would you define as sensitivity analysis (change just in one 
risk factor) and how many are scenario tests (simultaneous change in more risk 
factors) in percentage? Do you use scenario tests based on historical events (and 
which historical stress events do you consider relevant)? Do you use hypothetical 
scenarios? Do you run tests for key decision of management on new products, 
policy changes etc.? 
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5. How do you decide about the magnitude of changes in risk factors for hypothetical 
scenarios? (based on historical changes, on experts’ forecasts, on some macro 
models….)? 
 
6. Did your methods/scenarios/models/importance of stress testing changed 
considerably since this financial crisis started?  
 
7. What kind of link do you use between defined changes in risk factors in scenario 
and risk parameters to set their value under stress correctly? 
 
8. How often do you run regular stress tests? How long does it take on average to run 
one test (from defining scenario till the report with results)? How often do you 
change (update) scenarios for stress testing? 
 
9. How often do you present the results of stress tests to management and which 
actions could be taken based on the results?   
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Appendix 2: Complete results of tests for regression models from 
chapter 7 
1) Test for model for aggregated data on PD for whole corporate  
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2,38482 
multicolinearity test 
Values > 10.0 may indicate a collinearity problem 
  27)    real_rate_3M    3,513 
  45)      CZK_EURb_4    4,540 
  46)   corp_loans__4    5,114 
  42)      ind_prices    3,967 
White's test for heteroskedasticity 
Test statistic: TR^2 = 11,055375, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(14) > 11,055375) = 0,681680 
normal residuals - Test for null hypothesis of normal distribution: 
Chi-square(2) = 1,483 with p-value 0,47634 
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation up to order 4 
Test statistic: LMF = 1,834637, 
with p-value = P(F(4,7) > 1,83464) = 0,227 
Alternative statistic: TR^2 = 8,188887, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 8,18889) = 0,0849 
Ljung-Box Q' = 2,94456 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 2,94456) = 0,567 
 
2) Tests for regression model for investment part of portfolio 
  Durbin-Watson statistic = 2,66126 
  colinearity 
Values > 10.0 may indicate a collinearity problem 
27)    real_rate_3M    1,188 
   45)      CZK_EURb_4    2,667 
   46)   corp_loans__4    2,387 
White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
   Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
   Test statistic: LM = 13,2581 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(9) > 13,2581) = 0,151273 
Test for normality of residual - 
   Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed 
   Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 2,65089 
   with p-value = 0,265685 
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation up to order 4 
Test statistic: LMF = 2,594700, 
with p-value = P(F(4,8) > 2,5947) = 0,117 
Ljung-Box Q' = 5,92118 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 5,92118) = 0,205 
 
3) Tests for regression for sub-investment part of portfolio 
 Durbin-Watson statistic = 2,34718 
collinearity 
 Values > 10.0 may indicate a collinearity problem 
  27)    real_rate_3M    3,513 
  45)      CZK_EURb_4    4,540 
  46)   corp_loans__4    5,114 
  42)      ind_prices    3,967 
White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
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   Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
   Test statistic: LM = 11,2125 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(14) > 11,2125) = 0,669268 
Test for normality of residual - 
   Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed 
   Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 1,53255 
  with p-value = 0,464741 
LM test for autocorrelation up to order 4 - 
  Null hypothesis: no autocorrelation 
   Test statistic: LMF = 1,8604 
   with p-value = P(F(4,7) > 1,8604) = 0,222275 
 
4) Model for non-aggregated data – PDs for each rating class as panel data 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal covariance matrix: (based on OLS estimate) 
   Chi-square(78) = 175,376 with p-value 0,0000 
WLS method 
autocorrelation test 
Equation 1: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 10,4874 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 10,4874) = 0,033 
Equation 2: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 4,21425 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 4,21425) = 0,378 
Equation 3: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 4,2367 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 4,2367) = 0,375 
Equation 4: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 4,82708 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 4,82708) = 0,306 
Equation 5: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 3,22715 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 3,22715) = 0,521 
Equation 6: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 1,55863 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 1,55863) = 0,816 
Equation 7: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 10,5157 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 10,5157) = 0,0326 
Equation 8: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 4,88051 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 4,88051) = 0,3 
Equation 9: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 5,14776 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 5,14776) = 0,272 
Equation 10: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 6,90357 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 6,90357) = 0,141 
Equation 11: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 2,33826 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 2,33826) = 0,674 
Equation 12: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 10,3691 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 10,3691) = 0,0346 
Equation 13: 
Ljung-Box Q' = 9,81969 with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 9,81969) = 0,0436 
 
test for ARCH effects of order 4 
Equation 1: 
   Null hypothesis: no ARCH effect is present 
   Test statistic: LM = 8,77165 
  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 8,77165) = 0,0670675 
Equation 2: 
   Test statistic: LM = 0,24951 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 0,24951) = 0,992836 
Equation 3: 
   Test statistic: LM = 0,504241 
with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 0,504241) = 0,973087 
Equation 4: 
   Test statistic: LM = 0,336976 
  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 0,336976) = 0,987304 
Equation 5: 
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  Test statistic: LM = 2,58376 
  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,58376) = 0,629703 
Equation 6: 
  Test statistic: LM = 2,37995 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,37995) = 0,666254 
Equation 7: 
   Test statistic: LM = 3,8675 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 3,8675) = 0,424235 
Equation 8: 
   Test statistic: LM = 9,27797 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 9,27797) = 0,0545149 
Equation 9: 
 Test statistic: LM = 5,77588 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 5,77588) = 0,216523 
Equation 10: 
   Test statistic: LM = 2,10442 
  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,10442) = 0,71656 
Equation 11: 
   Test statistic: LM = 0,645542 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 0,645542) = 0,957871 
Equation 12: 
   Test statistic: LM = 4,95361 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 4,95361) = 0,29209 
Equation 13: 
   Test statistic: LM = 1,29733 
   with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 1,29733) = 0,861829 
 
Normality of residuals 
Test for multivariate normality of residuals 
Doornik-Hansen Chi-square(26) = 26,1473, with p-value = 0,455034 
 
5) Model for prediction the ind_prices 
 
OLS estimates Dependent variable: ind_prices 
 
                  coefficient   std. error   t-ratio   p-value  
  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             70,7351       7,21531     9,803    2,26E-07 *** 
  CZK_EURb_2       720,667      185,546       3,884    0,0019   *** 
  real_GDP_gr_4     89,8726      12,7305      7,060    8,55E-06 *** 
 
  Mean of dependent variable = 101,894 
  Standard deviation of dep. var. = 2,76971 
  Sum of squared residuals = 23,6159 
  Standard error of the regression = 1,34781 
  Unadjusted R-squared = 0,79477 
  Adjusted R-squared = 0,76319 
  F-statistic (2, 13) = 25,1716 (p-value = 3,39e-005) 
  Durbin-Watson statistic = 1,28933 
  First-order autocorrelation coeff. = 0,32233 
  Log-likelihood = -25,8177 
  Akaike information criterion (AIC) = 57,6353 
  Schwarz Bayesian criterion (BIC) = 59,9531 
  Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) = 57,754 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity - 
  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
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  Test statistic: LM = 0,841197 
  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(2) > 0,841197) = 0,656654 
 
Test for normality of residual - 
  Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed 
  Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 0,699044 
  with p-value = 0,705025 
 
LM test for autocorrelation up to order 4 - 
  Null hypothesis: no autocorrelation 
  Test statistic: LMF = 1,18682 
  with p-value = P(F(4,9) > 1,18682) = 0,379603 
